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Abstract:  In the first chapter, the hypothesis that workers are fully compensated in wages 
for differences in cost of living is tested for four groups of workers with different levels 
of educational attainment for the years of 2000, 2006, and 2011. Unlike previous studies, 
based on the 2SLS method, I find that the wage-price elasticity generally increases with 
educational attainment in the more recent years. The empirical results support the full 
compensation hypothesis for workers with educational attainment equal to or higher than 
some college in the more recent years, while workers whose educational attainment is 
lower than high-school are found to be incompletely compensated in all years. In the 
second chapter, the Panel Analysis of Nonstationarity in Idiosyncratic and Common 
components (PANIC) approach with recursive mean adjustment method (RMA) is 
applied to investigate regional economic convergence in China. Unlike previous research 
which finds evidence in favor of intra-region economic convergence, based on a panel set 
of real per capita GDP for 28 provincial unit in China from 1978-2012, after bias 
reduction, common factors are found to be nonstationary for China and its three sub-
regions. Most of the idiosyncratic components are also found to have a unit root. My 
results show then that regional economic clubs do not exist in China; thus, reflecting the 
problem of provincial growth divergence in China. In the third chapter, a new G2SLS 
approach proposed by Lee (2007) and developed by Bramoullé et al. (2009) is first 
applied to investigate spillover effects of counties’ employment growth, initial fiscal 
policy variables and initial employment density for the U.S. Unlike the conventional 
Spatial-Durbin IV model, according to the results of the G2SLS approach, no evidence of 
spillover effects of employment growth is found; positive spillover effects on 
employment growth is found for initial safety expenditures in 2000-2007 and 2000-2010, 
and for initial high-tech employment share in 2000-2010. Initial log of county 
employment density is found to lower its own employment growth rate. The Monte Carlo 
simulation results imply that, based on the group interaction structure in the sample, the 
G2SLS approach provides credible identification of the model parameters. 
 
 v 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Chapter          Page 
 
1. Full Compensation Hypothesis: Does it Hold for All Workers? 
 
 1.1    Introduction .....................................................................................................1 
 1.2    Model ..............................................................................................................4 
 1.3    Empirical Method ...........................................................................................6 
 1.4    Data .................................................................................................................8 
 1.5    Empirical Results ..........................................................................................10 
          1.5.1   Ordinary Least Squares ......................................................................10 
          1.5.2   Instrumental Variable Estimation ......................................................11 
 1.6    Conclusion ....................................................................................................16 
 
 
2. Regional Divergence in China: Evidence From the PANIC Approach With Bias 
    Reduction 
  
 2.1    Introduction ...................................................................................................19 
      2.2    Data ...............................................................................................................23 
 2.3    Econometric Model .......................................................................................25 
          2.3.1   PANIC Approach ...............................................................................26 
          2.3.2   RMA Approach ..................................................................................29 
 2.4    Empirical Results ..........................................................................................30 
          2.4.1   Stationary of the Common Factor ......................................................30 
          2.4.2   Stationary of the Idiosyncratic Component .......................................31 
               2.4.3   Economic divergence in China ..........................................................33 
 2.5    Conclusion ....................................................................................................34 
 
3. Identification and the Reflection Problem in Spatial Econometrics: An Applica- 
    tion using U.S. Counties 
  
 3.1    Introduction ...................................................................................................36 
      3.2    Identification Strategy ...................................................................................38 
 3.3    Data ...............................................................................................................42 
 3.4    Estimation Method ........................................................................................44 
 3.5    Empirical Results ..........................................................................................50 
 3.6    Monte Carlo Simulation ................................................................................54 
 3.7    Conclusion ....................................................................................................56
 vi 
  
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................58 
 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................63
 vii 
   
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
Table           Page 
 
   1.1..............................................................................................................................65 
   1.2..............................................................................................................................65 
   1.3..............................................................................................................................66 
   1.4..............................................................................................................................67 
   1.5..............................................................................................................................68 
   1.6..............................................................................................................................69 
   1.7..............................................................................................................................70 
   2.1..............................................................................................................................71 
   2.2..............................................................................................................................71 
   2.3..............................................................................................................................72 
   2.4..............................................................................................................................73 
   2.5..............................................................................................................................74 
   2.6..............................................................................................................................74 
   2.7..............................................................................................................................75 
   3.1..............................................................................................................................76 
   3.2..............................................................................................................................78 
   3.3..............................................................................................................................78 
   3.4..............................................................................................................................79 
   3.5..............................................................................................................................80 
   3.6..............................................................................................................................81 
   3.7..............................................................................................................................82 
   3.8..............................................................................................................................83 
   3.9..............................................................................................................................84 
   3.10............................................................................................................................85 
 1 
   
CHAPTER I 
 
 
Full Compensation Hypothesis: Does it Hold for All Workers? 
 
1.1. Introduction 
    Spatial equilibrium theory (Roback 1982) suggests that workers should be fully compensated 
for differences in cost of living in equilibrium. More specifically, after controlling for observable 
individual characteristics and amenities across areas, the elasticity between wages and cost of 
livings should equal one. This is referred to as the full compensation hypothesis in the literature. 
With given levels of amenities, workers will require higher wages to work in a city with higher 
prices.  
But, does the full compensation hypothesis really hold? A number of studies assumed that it 
held for all workers and used fully-adjusted wages for interarea wage differentials to measure the 
implicit prices of amenities across cities (e.g. Rosen, 1979; Roback, 1982; Gabriel et al., 2003; 
Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2004). But to date few studies have tested the full compensation 
hypothesis empirically. 
The literature shows mixed results about the elasticity between wages and prices. Roback 
(1988) estimated a wage-price elasticity of 0.97, both with and without controls for amenities. 
She obtained this estimate by using a cost of living index produced by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS), and dividing all workers into two different types: high income and low income.       
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Then she assigned different bundles of consumption goods for the two types of workers, and this 
results in different price levels for the two worker groups. Her results support the full 
compensation hypothesis. But her arbitrary assignment of different bundles of consumption goods 
may weaken the robustness of her empirical findings. Instead of using the now discontinued cost 
of living index by the BLS, DuMond et al. (1999) used the ACCRA Cost of Living Index to 
compose city price indexes. With controls for amenities, he estimates a wage-price elasticity of 
0.46; while, without controlling for amenities, the estimated wage-price elasticity is 0.37.  
Winters (2009) reexamines Roback (1988) and argues that her measurement of prices is 
inappropriate and biases her estimates. He finds that estimates of the wage-price elasticity are 
sensitive to whether housing costs are measured by housing values or rent payments and the 
estimation method. When housing prices are measured by housing values and using OLS, the 
elasticity between wages and the general price level is less than 0.5, when measuring housing 
prices by rents and using OLS, the wage-price elasticity is 0.7. Instrumenting the rent-based price 
index using rents for the previous year produces an elasticity nearly identical to one. He argues 
that the results from rent-based housing costs and IV estimation should be preferred, which lends 
support for the full compensation hypothesis.  
    Few studies have been done to study the validity of the full compensation hypothesis for 
different groups of workers in the US. This is because the mobility of workers changes with their 
educational attainment (Wozniak, 2010; Malamud and Wozniak, 2012). Workers who are more 
mobile are more likely to move to places where they could be fully compensated; while less 
mobile workers are more likely to be restricted in their current locations, although they are not 
fully compensated there. DuMond et al. (1999) divided workers into four groups according to 
their educational attainment. They find the wage-price elasticity to be decreasing with education, 
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and the elasticity for all four groups is less than 0.5. Winters (2009)1 also divided workers into 
four groups, and by using the 2006 Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group samples, 
he finds the wage-price elasticity to be significantly larger than those found by DuMond et al. 
(1999) for all four groups. He finds the elasticity for high school dropouts to be significantly 
larger than one in all the cases, while the elasticity for college graduate is found to be less than 
one; he also finds the wage-price elasticity to be decreasing with education.  
In this study, by applying Roback’s (1982) framework and following Winters (2009), I 
develop a model which predicts that, after controlling for amenities, the elasticity between wages 
and the general price level should equal 1. But I use different samples than Winters (2009). My 
samples are American Community Survey's 2000 5% sample data and 1% sample data for 2006 
and 2011. By using these samples, I investigate whether the full compensation hypothesis holds 
for workers with different levels of educational attainment. Unlike previous research, I assign 
both same and group-specific housing and non-housing goods weights to different groups of 
workers to calculate city level price indices for each group. This is because group-specific 
weights could eliminate any possible bias that may be caused by assigning incorrect weights to 
workers. Previous studies just looked at one year, but because the spatial equilibrium assumption 
may not be achieved in a particular  year, I examine different years. I test the hypothesis for 2000, 
2006, and 2011. I divide workers into four different groups according to their educational 
attainment: less than high-school, high-school graduate, some college, college and above. I test 
whether the full compensation hypothesis holds for each group. 
My empirical results support the full compensation hypothesis for workers with higher 
educational attainment in the more recent years. Workers whose educational attainment is lower 
than high-school are found to be incompletely compensated, while workers whose educational 
                                                           
1 See John Winters’ dissertation, Essay I: “Wages and prices: Are Workers fully compensated for cost of      
living differences”. 
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attainment are equal to or higher than some college are found to be fully compensated in 2006 
and 2011.  Workers who graduate from high school or have equivalent diploma are found to be 
incompletely compensated in most of the cases in the two years, and fully compensated only in 
year 2006 while group-specific price weights are used.   
1.2. Model 
    The full compensation hypothesis suggests that workers should be fully compensated for 
different cost of living, while controlling for amenities. This implies that the elasticity between 
wage and price should be equal to one. Following Roback’s (1982) framework, I include different 
groups of worker into Winters’s (2009) model to develop a model of the equilibrium relationship 
between wages, prices, and amenities across cities for workers with different educational 
attainments. In any city, identical firms with constant returns to scale technology use different 
kinds of labor N, where 
1 2( , , ... )nN N N N=  is a vector that contains all kinds of labor that a firm 
uses in production, capital K and land L are used to produce housing H and other non-housing 
goods X given locational differences in productivity due to amenities A:  
( , , ; )
( , , ; )
H H N K L A
X X N K L A
=
=
 
   The marginal product of labor, capital, and land are all non-negative, but increases in amenities 
can either increase or decrease productivity.  Wages, W, where 
1 2( , , ... )nW W W W= , and rent of 
land, 
L
R  , are determined competitively in local markets, while the price of capital is determined 
exogenously in the world market and normalized to 1. Thus, the price of housing 
H
P and the price 
of non-housing goods 
x
P  are the relative prices to the price of capital. In equilibrium, firms earn 
zero economic profits and the price of each good is equal to its average cost (
H
C ,
X
C ): 
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( , ; )
( , ; )
H L H
X L X
C W R A P
C W R A P
=
=
 
where 
H
C is the cost of producing housing services and 
X
C is the cost of producing non-housing 
goods. 
    Workers maximize utility subject to their total wages and their utility is a function of housing, 
non-housing goods and location-specific amenities:  
( , ; )i iU U H X A=  
where i denotes different groups of workers.  
    The utility function is assumed to increase in H and X, while being concave in H and X. A is 
an exogenous parameter that shifts utility level. Workers are assumed to be mobile across cities. 
According to spatial equilibrium theory, because of perfect mobility the utility levels for identical 
workers are equal across areas in equilibrium. Thus, the indirect utility function for the different 
groups of workers is: 
( , , ; )i i i H XV V W P P A=           (1.1) 
    Taking the total differential of both sides of equation (1.1),  
i i i i
i i H X
i H X
V V V V
dV dW dP dP dA
W P P A
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= + + +
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
setting 0
i
dV = , rearranging, and employing Roy’s Identity gives the relationship between wages 
and prices: 
* * *i i H i X AdW H dP X dP P dA= + −           (1.2) 
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     Dividing both sides of equation (1.2) by W, and converting the equation into logarithmic form 
we have: 
ln ( / )* ln ( / )* ln ( / )*i H i i H X i i X A id W P H W d P P X W d P P W dA= + −            (1.3) 
     In equation (1.3), /H i iP H W  is the share of wages spent on housing, and /X iP X W is the 
share of wages spent on non-housing goods. Equation (1.3) implies that, ceteris paribus, if either 
housing costs or the price of non-housing goods increase one-percent, workers will demand 
wages to increase exactly the percentage of the share of the corresponding goods to keep the same 
utility. If individual workers maximize their utility we have 
H i X i iP H P X W+ = , which means 
/ / 1H i i X i iP H W P X W+ = This implies that in order to keep the same utility level, wages should 
be increased by one percent if the price for all the goods increases one percent.  
    The assumption of perfect mobility may be true for workers with higher educational 
attainment, and less true for workers with lower educational attainment.  Actually, Katz and 
Autor (1999), Lemieux (2008), Autor et al. (2008), and Moretti (2013) have showed that there 
has been real-wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers since 1980. But, in order to 
see which group of workers is fully compensated and which is not, and how incompletely 
compensated a particular group is, we have to rely on the empirical results. 
1.3. Empirical Method and Data   
Based on the model, my basic empirical equation is a variation of equation (1.3):   
ln lneij eij j j e e e j eij eijW Y P A Ind Occ Job City Eduβ θ γ φ ϕ ψ ρ τ ε= + + + + + + + +       (1.4) 
where i denotes individual worker, e denotes the educational group that the worker belongs to,  
and j denotes city, the so-called city in this paper is either a Core Based statistical Area(CBSA) or 
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a Combined Statistical Area(CSA)2. 
eijW  is the hourly wage of individual i belonging to group e 
in location j, 
eijY  contains individual characteristic variables: dummy variables for race/ethnicity 
groups, sex, marriage status, employed part-time, enrolled part-time in school, educational 
attainment, naturalized citizen and non-citizen, and a quadratic specification for experience. 
jP  is 
the price level in city j. 
jA  is the vector that contains amenity variables for city j, these amenity 
variables are: mean January temperature, mean July temperature, mean July humidity, mean 
hours of sunlight, topology, and water percentage of the area. 
e
Ind contains 16 dummy variables 
denoting the industry that worker i works in, and 
e
Occ  contains 25 dummy variables denoting 
worker i’s occupation, 
e
Job  are the dummy variables that denote whether worker i works in a 
non-profit organization, federal government, state government or local government. jCity  
includes 7 dummy variables regarding the city j’s size, and 9 dummy variables showing the 
region that city j locates. 
eijEdu  contains variables that control for the detailed educational 
attainment of each worker. eijε  is the individual error term. This model is applied to three years: 
2000, 2006 and 2011. 
The dependent variable is the log of the hourly wage ( ( (1 ))eij eijW τ− ). Hourly wage is 
calculated by dividing total wage by the total hours worked (total hours worked equals weeks 
worked times usual hours worked per week3). Following Winters (2009), I adjust the wage for 
federal income tax by computing the federal tax rate ( eijτ ) for each worker. 
4  I use the usual 
weekly earnings times average number of weeks workers worked in the March CPS of each year 
to calculate the corresponding annual earnings. As a result, the average number of weeks worked 
                                                           
2 Cities in this research are defined by the IPUMS metarea variable. 
3 For the year 2011, the exact number of weeks worked are not reported, and instead a interval of weeks 
worked is reported; the number of weeks worked is calculated as the mean value of the reported interval of 
weeks worked. 
4 For a detailed description of adjusting wages for federal  tax, please see Winters (2009) 
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are 48 for year 2000, 48.3 for year 2006, and 48.6 for year 2011. Once the federal tax rate is 
calculated, the after-tax hourly wage is computed as ( (1 ))eij eijW τ− . 
    The city price level, 
jP , is a weighted average of the housing price index and the non-housing 
price index, and weights are chosen based on the shares of housing and non-housing expenditures 
computed according to the Consumer Expenditure Survey of the corresponding years. As a result, 
the housing price is given a weight of 0.283 for year 2000, 0.292 for year 2006, and 0.286 for 
year 2011; non-housing price is given a weight of 0.717 for year 2000, 0.708 for year 2006, and 
0.714 for year 2011. 
    Following Winters (2009), the housing price used in this paper is computed based on quality-
adjusted rent. In order to calculate the quality-adjusted rent for each city in the sample for a given 
year, the first step is to regress log gross rent r, for each housing unit on a vector of housing 
characteristics, 
hjT , and a vector of city-specific fixed effects, jδ : 
ln hj hj j hjr T uβ δ= + +           (1.5) 
where h denotes individual house and j denote the city where the house is located.  
The housing characteristics included are dummy variables for the number of bedrooms, the 
total number of rooms, the age of the structure, the number of units in the building, modern 
plumbing, modern kitchen facilities. Quality-adjusted rent is then predicted for each city based on 
the estimated parameters by using the sample mean of the housing characteristics. Then this 
predicted quality-adjusted rents for each city is divided by its mean across cities and times 100 to 
create the housing price index based on quality-adjusted rents.  
1.4. Data 
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Non-housing price levels for cities are computed based on four sub-indices from the ACCRA 
cost of living index: groceries, transportation, healthcare, and miscellaneous goods and services5. 
These four sub-indices are given different weights each year based on their corresponding shares 
of total expenditure computed from CES6.  Individual level data come from three samples of the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). These samples are the American Community 
Survey's 2006 and 2011 1% sample and the 2000 5% sample. From these samples, I use 
individual observations aged 16 to 65, and individuals who didn’t report income or rent are 
excluded from the sample7. I include part-time and part-year workers. The ACCRA cost of living 
index does not report price data for all areas in each year, and the cities included in the report also 
change year by year. Therefore, I have to exclude some cities from the analysis. The samples then 
contain 202 cities with 1,036,922 workers for 2000, 201 cities with 196,449 workers for 2006, 
and 202 cities with 213,904 workers for 2011. The workers in the sample cities account for 
85.4%, 86.9%, and 84.9% of the total workers8 in the sample for year 2000, 2006, and 2011, 
respectively. In this paper, I divided all the workers in each year into 4 groups by their 
educational attainment: less than high-school, high-school, some college and college and above. 
The less than high-school group contains workers who have never been to high school and high 
school dropouts. The high-school group contains workers who finished high school or have 
equivalent educational attainment, but did not go to college. The some college group contains 
workers who got an associate degree or have been to college but did not get a bachelor’s degree. 
                                                           
5 Utilities are not included because housing rent already contains a large part of utilities. 
6 The weight are: for 2000, groceries(0.124), transportation(0.272), healthcare(0.076), and miscellaneous 
goods and services(0.528); for 2006, groceries(0.131), transportation(0.248), healthcare(0.081), and 
miscellaneous goods and services(0.54); for 2011, groceries(0.123) transportation(0.234), 
healthcare(0.093), and miscellaneous goods and services(0.55) 
7 When choosing the sample, teenagers who live with their parents and don’t pay rent are not included in 
this research. There is still a possibility that some teenagers live with their parents and pay lower rent than 
they should. Since the housing index in this research is a relative index to the mean of the whole sample, as 
long as those teenagers are randomly drawn from the population in all the cities included in the research, 
the bias of the housing index that may be caused by the inclusion of teenagers should not be worried too 
much about. 
8 The number of total workers here means the total number of workers in the data who are renters and have 
all the necessary  information (rents, wages, and etc.). 
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The college-and-above group contains workers who got a bachelor’s degree or higher. Because 
the gross rent for house owners are imputed rents9, which is more subjective, so far in this 
research, only renters are included.           
Table 1.1 contains the summary statistics for several price indexes for years 2000, 2006, and 
2011.  
1.5. Empirical Results 
This section presents the empirical results. The reduced-form models in equation (1.4) are 
estimated with both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) with an 
instrument for prices to account for possible measurement errors in the ACCRA cost of living 
price index. In all the regressions, the individual characteristic variables, amenity variables, 
industry, occupation and job category dummy variables, detailed educational attainment variables 
and city size and region dummies are included. For both OLS and 2SLS, equation (1.4) is first 
estimated with all the observations and then for each education group. 
1.5.1. Ordinary Least squares 
Table 1.2 shows the results based on OLS for all workers for years 2000, 2006, and 2011. 
Based on the OLS results, we can see that the wage-price elasticity is significantly different from 
one at 1% level for all three years, which suggests that, for all the workers, the full compensation 
hypothesis generally does not hold in these years. 
Table 1.3 contains the results based on OLS for different education groups for years 2000, 
2006, and 2011.   
In Table 1.3, Panel A contains the results for the year 2000. It shows that all four groups of 
workers are incompletely compensated, though workers with educational attainment equal to high 
school and some college are compensated roughly the same. Workers in the less-than-high-school 
                                                           
9 Imputed  rents are attained by asking house owners how much they would like to pay for renting their 
own house. 
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group are the most incompletely compensated. Results for year 2006 are in Panel B, the estimated 
θ  generally increases with educational attainment. The wage-price elasticity for four groups of 
workers is significantly different from unity. Like year 2000, this suggests that all workers are 
incompletely compensated. The estimated wage-price elasticity for workers belonging to some-
college and college-and-above groups is 0.874 and 0.85, respectively; while the wage-price 
elasticity for high-school graduates and less-than-high-school group is 0.755 and 0.597, 
respectively. The estimated elasticity is significantly smaller for workers belonging to the less-
than-high-school and high-school groups, suggesting that they are more incompletely 
compensated. Panel C contains the results for year 2011.  The empirical results for year 2011 
suggest that the wage-price elasticity increases with educational attainment. Workers with higher 
educational attainment are more compensated than workers with lower educational attainment. 
The wage-price elasticity for all groups is significantly less than unity which implies that all 
workers are incompletely compensated.  
    Overall, the OLS results for all workers and the four education groups of workers suggest that 
full compensation hypothesis does not hold in 2000, 2006 and 2011.  Although the wage-price 
elasticity for all workers is significantly less than one in all three years, workers with higher 
educational attainment are generally more fully compensated than workers with lower 
educational attainment. 
1.5.2.  Instrumental Variables Estimation 
It is likely that the two components of the price index ‒ the quality-adjusted rent and non-
housing price based on the ACCRA cost of living index ‒ have measurement error. Housing rents 
may be subject to some degree of sampling error and the ACCRA cost of living index may 
contain measurement errors that come from different sources. Given that the wage price elasticity 
is expected to be positive, the measurement error will cause the estimated wage-price elasticity 
based on OLS to be downwardly-biased towards zero. It is possible that OLS will give an 
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estimated wage-price elasticity that is significantly less than unity for workers while those 
workers are actually full compensated. Instrumental variables should be used to address the 
measurement error in the price indices. 
    Winters (2009) argued that lagged components of the price index can be used as the 
instruments, and as long as the measurement error is random this will yield consistent estimate of 
the wage-price elasticity. However, if the measurement errors are serially correlated, the θ  
estimated by this method is still not consistent. Due to a number of reasons10, the measurement 
error in the non-housing price based on ACCRA cost of living index is more likely to be serially 
correlated than the housing price index based on quality-adjusted rents. Thus, I choose the lagged 
housing price to be the instrument.  Based on the data available, I use the housing price index 
based on quality-adjusted rents of years 1990, 2005, and 2010, as the instrument variable for price 
level in years 2000, 2006, and 2010, respectively. This causes the number of cities included in the 
sample to be reduced to 178 for year 200011, while it remains the same for the other two years.  
Table 1.4 contains the results based on 2SLS for all workers for years 2000, 2006, and 2011. In 
all regressions, the test statistics reject the weak instrument hypothesis. As expected, the elasticity 
estimated by 2SLS using lagged housing price as the instrument is larger than the OLS estimate, 
confirming that an instrumental variable should indeed be used to take care of the downward-bias 
caused by measurement error, and the lagged housing price is a reasonable choice. The reason 
that the partial 
2R of the excluded instrument is considerably smaller for year 200012 may due to 
                                                           
10 The ACCRA cost of living data for a given city is collected by people ( in many cases the same people) 
who follow the same method in certain places in the city at different times.  The American Community 
Survey data is collected based on random sampling of individual households. If there exists measurement 
error, the measurement error in ACCRA cost of living data is more likely to be serial correlated than that in 
the American Community Survey data. 
11 The total number of observations included in the model is reduced from  1,036,922 to 1,017,736 or  a 
1.85% decrease  in sample size. 
12 This is also true in all the 2SLS models. 
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the 10-year time difference between 1990 and 2000. The other two cases have only 1-year time 
difference between the lagged housing price index and the rent-based price index.   
Now the wage-elasticity for 2000, 2006, and 2011 are 0.796, 0.864, and 0.826, respectively, 
and they are still all significantly different from unity at the 1% level. This suggests that, overall, 
the full compensation hypothesis does not hold for all workers in these three years.   
Table 1.5 contains the empirical results for education groups in years 2000, 2006, and 2011. 
The weak instrument hypothesis is rejected in all the regressions. Panel A contains the results for 
year 2000. With an estimated wage-price elasticity of 0.917, the some-college group is the only 
group that has a wage-price elasticity not significantly different from unity; while the wage-price 
elasticity for all the other groups is found to be significantly less than unity. As a result, in year 
2000, workers belonging to some-college group are found to be fully compensated, while workers 
in other groups are found to be incompletely compensated. Panel B contains the results for year 
2006. The wage-price elasticity for Some-college group and College-and-above group is 0.969 
and 0.9, respectively, and both not significantly different from unity; while the wage-price 
elasticity for Less-than-high-school group and High-school group is 0.636 and 0.815 respectively, 
and both significantly less than one. These empirical results imply that, in 2006, workers with 
educational attainment equal to and higher than some college are fully compensated, while 
workers with educational attainment less than some college are incompletely compensated. 
Empirical results for year 2011 are shown in Panel C.  Similar to year 2006, the most educated 
two groups: Some-college group and College-and-above group are found to be fully compensated, 
while their less educated counterparts: Less-than-high-school group and High-school group are 
found to be incompletely compensated.  
Based on the above 2SLS results, the full compensation hypothesis holds for workers with 
educational attainment equal to or higher than some college, except for the college-and-above 
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group in year 2000. On the contrary, the full compensation hypothesis does not hold for workers 
with educational attainment lower than some college in all three years.  For the more recent 
years-2006 and 2011, the wage-price elasticity generally increases with educational attainment; 
the wage-price elasticity for workers in the two least educated groups is significantly less than 
unity, while the wage-price elasticity for workers in the two most educated groups are not 
significantly different from unity. This means that, in the more recent two years, the more 
educated a worker is, the more compensated he will be, and the full compensation hypothesis 
holds only for workers whose educational attainment is at least equal to some college. 
The previous empirical results are based on using the same weights for different groups of 
workers in a given year. However, the weights for the housing index, non-housing index, and the 
components for non-housing index may differ not only across years, but also across different 
groups of workers.  
    From the following equation: 
             ln ( / )* ln ( / )* ln ( / )*i H i i H X i i X A id W P H W d P P X W d P P W dA= + −  
where i denotes different groups of workers. “ /H i iP H W ” and “ /X iP X W ” is the weight of 
housing index and non-housing index for the 
thi  group of workers, respectively. “ /H i iP H W ” and 
“ /X iP X W ” may be different for different group of workers. A set of constant  weights for all 
the workers in a given year may not be appropriate.   
It is possible that conclusions about the compensation status of different workers may not be 
very accurate when we rely on empirical results based on the same weights for all workers in a 
given year. Group-specific weights for different groups of workers should be used for a 
robustness check.  Based on CES data for the four groups of workers for years 2000, 2006, and 
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2011, I recalculate the weights for each group in every year13 and use 2SLS to re-estimate the 
base model.  
    Table 1.6 contains the empirical results based on group-specific weights and 2SLS for all 
workers for years 2000, 2006, and 2011.  Test statistics reject the hypothesis of weak instruments 
in all regressions. Now the wage-price elasticity for 2000, 2006, and 2011 are 0.823, 0.982, and 
0.946, respectively.  Unlike the empirical results based on the same weight, only the wage-price 
elasticity for all workers in year 2000 is found to be significantly less than one, while the wage-
price elasticity for all workers in year 2006 and 2011 is found to be not significantly different 
from one. These results suggest that full compensation hypothesis holds for all workers in the 
more recent years-2006 and 2011.  
     Table 1.7 contains the empirical results based on group-specific weights and 2SLS method for 
education groups in years 2000, 2006, and 2011. The weak instrument hypothesis is rejected by 
test statistics in all models. Panel A contains the empirical results for year 2000. Now the Less-
than-high-school and College-and-above groups are still found to be incompletely compensated, 
while the High-school and Some-college groups are found to be fully compensated. Similar to the 
results in Panel A of Table 1.5, the full compensation hypothesis does not hold for workers with 
educational attainment equal to or higher than college. Wage-price elasticity for workers with 
educational attainment equal to or higher than college is smaller than that for workers with 
educational attainment equal to high-school or some college. Panel B shows the empirical results 
for year 2006.  Similar to Panel B of Table 1.5, workers belonging to the Less-than-high-school 
group are still found to be incompletely compensated, while workers with educational attainment 
equal to or higher than some college are found to be fully compensated. Unlike Panel B of Table 
1.5, workers belonging to the high-school group are found to be fully compensated. The 
implications of the empirical results in Panel C of Table 1.7 are consistent with those based on 
                                                           
13 Detailed weights for each price category for each groups of workers in different years are shown in 
Appendix table 1.8 
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Panel C of Table 1.5. Workers belonging to the two most educated groups are found to be fully 
compensated, while workers belonging to the two least educated groups are found to be 
incompletely compensated. 
     Although the weak instrument hypothesis is rejected in all the regressions in Table 1.7, the 
partial R-squares of excluded instruments in all the regressions in Table 1.7 are significantly 
smaller than the partial R-squares of excluded instruments in their corresponding regressions in 
Table 1.5.  Unless we can solve the direct utility function for different groups of workers in all 
years, we can’t find the “perfect” weights for all the sub-category indexes of the city price 
indexes for different groups of workers. By comparing the 2SLS empirical results based on same 
weights and group-specific weights, we can see that, in the more recent year-2006 and 2011, the 
wage-price elasticity generally increases with educational attainment. For 2006 and 2011, 
workers whose educational attainment is equal to or higher than some college are full 
compensated; workers whose educational attainment equal to high school may be incompletely 
compensated; and workers whose educational attainment is less than high school are incompletely 
compensated. A larger wage-price elasticity for more educated workers indicating that they are 
more compensated. More educated workers are usually more skilled and are very likely to be 
more mobile. It easier for them to move to places where they can be more compensated than their 
less educated counterparts. Studies have found evidence that worker mobility increases with 
educational attainment. Wozniak (2010) found that highly educated workers are better at locating 
in areas with high labor demand, and medium-term wage premium of entry labor market for 
college graduates equal or exceed those of less educated workers. Malamud and Wozniak (2012) 
found that there exists a causal impact of higher education on migration and additional years of 
college significantly increased the likelihood that men resided outside their birth states later in life.  
1.6. Conclusion 
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    In this paper, I examine whether the full compensation hypothesis holds for workers in 
different labor markets. Unlike previous research, I use both same and group-specific weights for 
the sub-category indexes for different groups of workers. Previous studies also just looked at one 
year, but because the spatial equilibrium assumption may not be achieved in a particular year, I 
examine three different years: 2000, 2006, and 2011. Empirical results from 2SLS (based on the 
two sets of price weights) do not suggest the exact same implications about the compensation 
status of different workers. But unlike previous studies, I still found that the wage-price elasticity 
generally increases with educational attainment, especially in 2006 and 2011. My empirical 
results support the full compensation hypothesis for workers with educational attainment equal to 
or higher than some college in 2006 and 2011. Workers whose educational attainment is lower 
than high-school are found to be incompletely compensated. Workers who graduated from high 
school or have an equivalent diploma are found to be incompletely compensated in most of the 
cases, and fully compensated only in 2000 and 2006 when group-specific price weights are used.   
    One important reason for the more compensated status of higher educated worker is they are 
more mobile. They are more likely to move to places where they can be fully compensated. In 
terms of policy suggestions, policies that can encourage mobility of less educated workers are 
needed. Government can provide better information on job opportunities, so that workers are 
more likely to either find jobs in the same place with higher wages or find  jobs in  new places 
where they can be more compensated for the cost of living. Government can improve relocation 
services, so it will cost less for workers to move to places where they can be more compensated 
for the cost of living. Post-school education and professional training are also important for less 
educated workers who never go to college. Government can start or support post-school high 
school education opportunities, and post-high school education and professional training 
opportunities. Workers whose educational attainment are equal to high-school can utilize the 
latter opportunities, and workers whose never go to high-school can utilize all the opportunities. 
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As these workers become more educated, they are more likely to move to places where they can 
be more compensated for the cost of living, and their individual welfares will be improved.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
      Regional divergence in China: 
         Evidence from the PANIC Approach with bias reduction 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The issue of regional economic convergence in China is re-investigated in this paper using the 
Panel Analysis of Nonstationarity in Idiosyncratic and Common (PANIC) components approach 
proposed by Bai and Ng (2004). Most of previous studies tested for a unit root in the provincial 
level per capita GDP to address this issue. So far, all these studies that applied time-series 
techniques assume cross-section independence across provinces. But the results from the cross- 
section independence test proposed by Pesaran (2007) suggest cross-section dependence among 
the provincial level per capita GDP data in China.  It has been shown that when unit root tests 
assume cross section independence are applied to cross-section dependent data, the hypothesis of 
a unit root in the data is over rejected.  So, panel unit root tests that incorporate cross-section 
dependence should be used to re-investigate regional economic convergence in China. 
    In this paper, I apply Bai and Ng's (2004) PANIC method to study the economic convergence 
in China for the “post-reform” period that starts since 1978. The PANIC approach allows me to 
test the null of a unit root in the common factor and idiosyncratic component separately. Thus, 
this gives a clearer picture about where the stationary or nonstationary in the income data comes 
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from. So we can have a better understanding of the economic divergence or convergence in 
China. The common factor can capture the influence of the central government of China14 on a 
province's economic development. If nonstationary is found in the common factor for China or 
the corresponding region, it means that the common factor is not leading to the economic 
convergence in China or that region. This is likely suggesting that economic policy and plans that 
are implemented by the central government are not helping to narrow the income gap among 
different provinces in China or that region. If stationarity is found in the idiosyncratic 
components, without the influence of the common factor, regional economic convergence is 
indicated.  The empirical results show a unit root in all the common factors and most 
idiosyncratic components, which suggest regional economic divergence in China during the post-
reform period. These findings have important implications for economic development policy. 
Economic convergence in China is of particular interest. One very important slogan that 
characterizes China's "Reform and Open" policy is "let some people and places become rich first 
and then eventually make all people and places rich". Thus, one of the key facts in evaluating the 
success of China's astonishing economic development during the post-reform period is whether 
the benefit from the economic growth is shared by most of the people in China. Testing for 
economic convergence in China can help us understand more about how successful the great 
economic success has benefitted different regions of China, and what kind of economic 
development policy should the Chinese central and provincial government consider in the future.  
Early empirical studies tried to use cross-section tests based on neoclassical growth models to 
find evidence for the convergence hypothesis. Baumol (1986), Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), 
                                                           
14 China's central government plays a very important role in the economy. It makes the Five-year economic 
development plans, it decides the development priority of certain industries and how infrastructure 
investment is divided among all the provinces. Once the central government's economic policy is decided, 
provincial governments have to make their own policy according to it or change their policy to adapt to it, 
and these policies are always given the priorities in the province. Thus, except for the individual province's 
own economic policy and conditions, the economy of every individual province is influenced significantly 
by one common factor--central government economic policy and plans. As a result, province-level per 
capita incomes in China is likely to contain at least one common factor. 
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Wolff (1991), Barro and Xavier Salai-Martin (1991,1992), and Mankiw et al. (1992) all find  
evidence in favor of convergence by examining the cross-sectional relationship between the 
growth rate of output per capita over some time period and the initial level of per capita output. 
However, Evans and Karras (1996) showed that this conventional approach is valid under the 
assumption that economies must have identical first-order autoregressive dynamic structures and 
very strong assumptions about the cross-economy differences. These assumptions are usually 
violated in the data. Thus, they suggested using a time series approach that is valid under much 
less restrictive conditions than conventional cross-section tests. Bernard and Durlauf (1996) 
argued that time series tests have a stronger notion of convergence than cross section tests.   
Most recent empirical studies of economic convergence rely on time series analysis. Under 
time series framework, the persistence of relative per capita outputs is evaluated and stochastic 
convergence occurs when the (log) per capita output of a country or region relative to a reference 
economy or region over a period is found to be stationary.  
Time series empirical findings for the economic convergence of China are few and mixed. 
Zhang et al. (2001) and Weeks and Yao (2003) apply the augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) 
test, with and without trend, and find evidence of intrazonal economic convergence between 
provinces in the eastern, central and western regions of China, but divergence between regions. 
They conclude that club convergence exists in China, but there is no national convergence.     
The conventional ADF test is known to have low power when the time period of the data is not 
long enough. Panel unit root tests which pool information across all the cross-sections together 
have better power. Pedroni and Yao (2006) employed the panel unit root test (IPS, MW) and find 
that per capita output of China of provinces converge before 1978, while diverge after it. 
Perron (1989) and Im et al. (2005) showed that ignoring structural breaks in time series or 
panel data may lead to a substantial loss of power or serious size distortions in the ADF, IPS, and 
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MW tests.  Liu et al. (2013) applied unit root tests with endogenously determined structural 
breaks to analyze the economic convergence in different regions in China from 1953 to 2007. 
They found that there are one or two structural breaks in some provinces, and for those provinces 
that have structural breaks, most of the breaks happened between 1967 and 1978. They found that 
economic convergence exists in regions but not between regions. 
 Although Liu et al. (2013) takes structural breaks into consideration, they still make the 
assumption that there is no cross-sectional dependence. Schwert (1989), Pantula (1991), and Ng 
and Perron (2001) argued and analyzed that the unit root test can be oversized and stationary tests 
will have no power when there exists a common factor in the time series data but is not separated 
from idiosyncratic components.  
The PANIC approach proposed by Bai and Ng (2004) has been used in empirical research in 
many economic topics, such as unemployment, real interest rate, consumption and wealth 
relationship, interest parity, money demand, export and output and etc. (see, for example, 
Nagayasu, 2011; Cheng et al., 2012; Dreger and Reimers, 2012; Dobnik, 2013; Dreger and Zhang, 
2014;  Everaert, 2014). It is a very powerful tool to analyze cross-sectional dependent time series 
data. It is even referred to as “one of the single most popular and general second-generation 
approaches around.”15  In this study, the PANIC approach is applied to the provincial level per 
capita GDP time series of China (1978-2012) to estimate the common factor and idiosyncratic 
component. Then unit root tests are carried out for the common factors and idiosyncratic 
components. In order to reduce the downward bias in the unit root test for the common factor, the 
Recursive Mean Adjustment (RMA) unit root test that proposed by Shin and So (2001) is applied. 
Unlike previous studies which found evidence in favor of sub-region economic convergence in 
China, my empirical results imply that, in general, regional economic divergence prevails in 
                                                           
15 See Westerlund, J. 2015. “ The power of PANIC.” Journal of Econometrics 185, 495-509. 
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China and its three sub-regions. Not only is there no economic convergence between different 
sub-regions, but there is also no economic convergence within the sub-regions.  
2.2. Data 
The data for this study are drawn from the China Compendium of Statistics (1949-1999) and 
the China Statistical Yearbook (2000-2012). This research is based on 28 provinces16 that are in 
mainland China. Data are available for those 28 provinces from 1953-2012. But the research 
period in this paper is from 1978-2012. There are two main reasons: 1) Based on the research by 
Liu et al. (2013), for most of the cases, a structural break at the provincial level occurs between 
1967-1978. So far, there is no PANIC with endogenous determined structural break approach. In 
order to avoid the bias that structural breaks in the provinces time series may cause, the period of 
1978-2012 is chosen. 2) The Chinese government chooses very different economic policy, and 
openness to international trade pre- and post-year 1978. After 1978, the Chinese government 
adopted the "Market Mechanism" to substitute for a lot of central planning in the economy of 
China, and it has been made very clear that the Chinese government will continue the policy.  So, 
testing the economic convergence before 1978 is interesting but may not have enough useful 
implications for understanding the current and future regional growth patterns in China. 
Based on the basic geographic information for Chinese provinces, the 28 provinces are divided 
into three sub-regions: The east region, the central region, and the west region. The east region 
contains 10 provinces and municipalities that are on the east coast of China. The central region 
contains 9 provinces that are not on the coast but share the boundary with a coastal province. The 
West region contains 8 provinces that are neither on the coast nor have a common boundary with 
a coastal province.  The 11 provinces in the east region are: Beijing, Tianjing, Hebei, Liaoling, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi.  The 9 provinces in 
                                                           
16 Provinces and equivalent contain provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the 
central government. In China, these areas are all considered as provincial level areas. For convenient, they 
will all be referred to as provinces later in this paper. 
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the central region are: Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, 
and Hunan. The 8 provinces in the west region are: Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaaxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia, and XinJiang. 
Since 1978, provinces in different sub-regions of China have experienced very different 
economic development speed, and the supports from central government’s policy are also 
different among the sub-regions. Even in the same sub-region, the support that each province can 
get from the central government is still different, although the magnitude of difference is not as 
large as that for different regions. After more than 30 years, do people live in the 28 provinces 
enjoy a more evenly distributed benefit from the economic development? Do people live in 
different provinces in the same sub-region enjoy a closer standard of living than before? Testing 
for economic convergence in China would show whether there is economic convergence across 
different regions in China. Testing for economic convergence in the three sub-regions would 
show whether there exist "regional income clubs". The PANIC approach is applied to a panel that 
consists of all the provinces in China, and panels that include those corresponding provinces in its 
three sub-regions separately. For each sub-region, the whole process of PANIC is applied for 
provinces only in that region. The test results imply  economic divergence/convergence: 1) for all 
the provinces in China, if stationary is found for the common factor, it suggests that central 
government policy is helping the economic convergence at the provincial level, and vice versa. If 
stationary is found for the panel of the idiosyncratic components, it suggests that, without other 
interventions, there exist economic convergence among the provinces, and vice versa. 2) for the 
panel of provinces in a sub-region of China, stationary for the common factor of that sub-region 
suggest that central government policy is helping the economy converge at the provincial level in 
that sub-region, and vice versa. Stationary for the panel of the idiosyncratic components suggests 
that, without other interventions, the economy converges among provinces in that region, and 
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vice versa. 3) If stationary is found for the idiosyncratic component of an individual province, it 
suggests that the economy of that province converges to the mean of the region17 it belongs to.  
 The Great Recession in the United States had a great impact on the economy of China. The 
Chinese Central government proposed a 4 trillion RMB fiscal stimulus package in 2008 and many 
other polices to help the economy keep growing. Since the infrastructure base and involvement in 
international trade are different across the 28 provinces, the impact on the Great Recession on the 
provinces varies a lot, and so does the benefits that provinces could get from the central 
government's stimulus package and other policies.  All these mean that the Great Recession may 
have altered the pattern of regional economic growth in China. Thus, in this paper, the regional 
economic convergence is studied for two periods: 1978-2007 and 1978-2012.  
 Real per capita GDP for each province is computed using 1995 as the base year for the GDP 
deflator, and then I take the natural log of real per capita GDP to get the logged time series data 
that are needed for testing economic convergence.  
2.3. Econometric model 
Let ,ir ty  be real per capita GDP for province i in region r at period t and there are N provinces 
in region r.  Define , , ,ln lnir t ir t r tY y y= − , where , ,
1
1
ln ln
N
r t ir t
i
y y
N
=
= ∑  is the cross sectional 
mean of the real per capita GDP for the n provinces in region r at time t.   Thus, 
,ir tY  is the 
deviation of real per capita GDP (log) of province i from the mean real per capita GDP (log) of 
the region to which it belongs. According to Evans and Karras (1996), stochastic convergence 
exists if  
,ir tY  is found to be stationary.  Thus, to test the economic convergence means to test the 
stationary of 
,ir tY . 
                                                           
17 The region can be China or the sub-region the province belongs to, depending on which panel of 
provinces are studied by the PANIC approach. 
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First, whether there exists cross-sectional dependence among 
,ir tY  should be tested. In this 
paper the cross-sectional independence test proposed by Pesaran (2007) is applied for the period 
1978-2012. Table 2.1 shows the results for the test. 
The results of the cross-section independence test show that the null hypothesis of            
cross-section independence is rejected for all the regions, and thus implies cross-section 
dependence between 
,ir tY  
2.3.1. PANIC Approach 
      Following Bai and Ng (2004), 
,ir tY  (i=1, ....N; t=1,...,T) is assumed to be generated by 
                 
'
, ,ir t i i t ir tY c F eλ= + +       (2.1) 
( ) ( )t tI L F C L u− =         (2.2) 
(1 ) ( )i it i itL e D Lρ ε− =     (2.3)     
where tF is the common factor  vector and ite is the idiosyncratic component. L is the lag 
operator, 
0
( ) jjjC L C L
∞
=
=∑ and 0( )
j
i ijj
D L D L
∞
=
=∑ . ~ (0, )t uu iid ∑ , for each 
i,
2~ (0, )it iiid εε δ . The idiosyncratic error ,ir te  is I(1) if iρ =1, and is stationary if  | |iρ <1. 
To apply the PANIC approach, we must first decide the number of common factors.  Bai and 
Ng (2002) propose the following way of determining the number of common factors.  Assume 
that  
,ir tY  is generated by the data generating process (2.1), (2.2), and (2.3), let k be the number of 
common factors, let 
k
Nrλ  denote the factor loading for the k common factors of the thN  province 
in region r and define
1 2( , ,....., ) '
k k k
r r Nrλ λ λΛ = . The common factors are estimated by the method 
of principal components.  Estimates of 
k
irλ and ktF are obtained by solving the optimization 
problem: 
                                                 
2
, 11 1,
1
( ) min ( )
k
N T k k
ir t r ti tF
V k Y F
NT
λ
= =Λ
= −∑ ∑  
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    The following two criteria18 can be used to determine the number of common factors: 
1
2
2
( ) ln( ( , )) ( ) ln( );
( ) ln( ( , )) ( ) ln( ) ln ;
k
k
NT
N T NT
IC K V k F k
NT N T
N T NT
IC K V k F k C
NT N T
∧
∧
+
= +
+
+
= +
+
 
where 
2 min{ , }NTC N T= . 
Table 2.2 shows the results for the information criteria.  
Based on the results, for all the regions and the two different time periods (1978-2007 and 
1978-2012),  it is determined that one common factor exists. The existence of the common factor 
is likely caused by the prominent role of the Chinese central government in the economy of 
China.    
   Once the number of common factors has been determined to be one, the PANIC approach can 
be carried out as follows.  Define 
, ,ir t ir tdy Y= ∆ , t tf F= ∆ , and , ,ir t ir teξ = ∆ .    
Then the model in first-differenced form is 
                                                    
'
, ,ir t i t ir tdy fλ ξ= +  
After applying the method of principal component to 
,ir tdy , we can get the estimated factors tf
∧
, 
the loadings 
iλ
∧
and the estimated residuals, 
'
, ,ir t ir t i tdy fξ λ
∧∧ ∧
= − . Then for t=2,...,T, define : 
                         , ,2
t
ir t ir ss
e ξ∧ ∧
=
=∑                     (i=1,...,N) 
2
t
t ss
F f
∧ ∧
=
=∑  
    Bai and Ng(2004) showed that 
,ir te  and tF can be consistently estimated in this way. Then, 
according to Bai and Ng (2004), the ADF test with no deterministic terms and no trends can be 
                                                           
18 Bai and Ng(2002) proposed three criterias, but the two that are used in this paper apply specifically to the 
principal components estimator. 
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applied to test the stationary of each idiosyncratic component and the ADF test with an intercept 
but with no trends can be applied to test the stationary of the common factor.  
    The ADF test for ,ir te
∧
 is: 
, 1 , 1 , 1, 0 1 ......ir t ir t ir tir t i i ipe e e e errorβ β β
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
− − −
∆ = + ∆ + + ∆ +         (2.4) 
The ADF test for 
tF
∧
 is: 
1 10 1 .......t t t qt qF c F F F errorγ γ γ
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
− − −
∆ = + + ∆ + + ∆ +         (2.5)  
where p and q are the optimal lags chosen by certain information criteria.  
Two popular information criteria that have been used extensively to choose the optimal lags for 
ADF tests are AIC and SBIC.  
 For a regression  1
1
p
t t j t j
j
x x x errorα β
− −
=
= + ∆ +∑  
2*ln( ) ln( )*SBIC LL T k= − +  
where LL is the likehood, T is the length of the time period and k is the model degrees of freedom. 
In this research,  SBIC19 is used to choose the optimal lag.  
   Once the ADF test in Equation (2.4) has been applied to all the idiosyncratic components, a 
panel unit root test statistic for these idiosyncratic terms can be constructed as follows: 
1
2 log ( ) 2
(0,1)
4
N
dei
e
P i N
P N
N
=
− −
= →
∑ $
$
 
                                                           
19 I also use AIC to choose the optimal lag. For most of the cases, these two information criteria choose the 
same lags. Even when they choose different lags, the resulted significant level of the ADF test is the same.  
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where, ( )
e
P i
$
 is the p value for the ADF test for the ith idiosyncratic component and N is the 
number of cross sections.  
2.3.2. RMA approach 
     Consider the following stochastic process for 
t
y : 
1t t ty c yα ε−= + +        (2.6)  
where c is an intercept, α is the persistence parameter and 
t
ε is a white noise process. It is well-
known that the least squares estimator for α is downwardly biased, and the bias is very severe 
when the data exhibits high persistence. The bias comes from the presence of the constant in 
Equation (2.6).  To observe the bias, convert Equation (2.6) into its demeaned equivalent: 
1( )t t ty y y yα µ−− = − +  
where 
1
1 T
s
s
y y
T
=
= ∑ , and (1 )t t c yµ ε α= + − − . sy  is correlated with tε for any s t≥ . 
Therefore, the demeaned regressor  1( )ty y− −  is correlated with tµ  and the OLS estimator is 
biased.  
   Instead of using y in the demeaned regression, the RMA estimator utilizes the recursively 
adjusted mean to reduce bias: 
11 1
( )t t tt ty y y yα ν−− −− = − +  
where 
1
1
1
1
1
t
st
s
y y
t
−
−
=
=
−
∑ . Now tε is orthogonal to the recursive mean adjusted regressor  
1 1
( )t ty y− −− , which results in a substantial bias reduction. 
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    For the ADF test with a constant for
t
y , Shin and So (2001) proposed the following recursively 
mean adjusted regression equation: 
1 1
1
( )
p
t t j t jt
j
y y y y errorρ θ
− −−
=
∆ = − + ∆ +∑        (2.7) 
The RMA-based ADF t-statistic can be constructed for ρ
∧
 for the null hypothesis of a unit-root.   
The OLS estimate of ρ  will be downwardly biased away from zero. As a result, the t-statistic 
for the ADF test will be larger in magnitude than its real value. Shin and So (2001) showed that 
the RMA-based unit root test is more powerful than the OLS-based test.  
So for Equation (2.5), the RMA-based ADF test will be: 
1 1 10 1( ) .......t t t t qt qF F F F F errorγ γ γ
∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧
− − − −
∆ = − + ∆ + + ∆ +        (2.8) 
where 
1
1
1
1
1
t
t s
s
F F
t
−∧ ∧
−
=
=
−
∑ . This is the test for tF
∧
that is utilized in this research.  Because there is 
no constant in Equation (2.4), the RMA-based ADF test is not needed for the unit root test of the 
idiosyncratic components. 
2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1. Stationary of the Common Factor 
Table 2.3 shows the unit root test results for the common factor for China and its three sub-
regions for 1978-2007 and 1978-2012 under both the conventional ADF test and the RMA-based 
ADF test.  As predicted, the t-statistic for the conventional ADF test is significantly larger in 
magnitude than that for the RMA-based ADF test. The common factor for China and the central 
region is found to be nonstationary for both the period even with the downwardly-biased ADF 
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test.  Based on the ADF test for the common factors, the common factors for the east and west 
regions are stationary for both periods. However, with the bias-reduced RM- based ADF test, the 
common factor for these two regions are found to be nonstationary in the two periods. 
Overall, according to the RMA-based ADF test, common factors are not stationary in China 
and all three sub-regions, which suggest in general that a determinant factor above all the 
provinces is not eliminating the income dispersion between rich and poor provinces.  
2.4.2. Stationary of the Idiosyncratic Component 
    Table 2.4 shows the unit root test results for the idiosyncratic component of 28 provinces when 
the PANIC approach is applied to the panel of all provinces in China. The panel unit root test 
statistics for idiosyncratic components 
e
P
$
show that there exists a unit root in the panel of the 28 
provinces for the two periods. The individual unit root test for each province finds that, only two 
provinces, Guangxi and Shanxi, have a stationary idiosyncratic component for the period 1978-
2007.  
For the period 1978-2012, only the idiosyncratic component for Guangxi is found to be 
stationary, and Shanxi in now found to have a unit root in its idiosyncratic component. For all the 
other provinces, the empirical results support the existence of nonstationarity in their 
idiosyncratic component for both periods.   
    The result for the idiosyncratic component taken together with that for the common factor 
implies that the time series 
,ir tY  for most provinces (except Guangxi and Shanxi in 1978-2007, 
and Guangxi in 1978-2012) consists of a nonstationary common factor and a nonstationary 
idiosyncratic component. This means that, overall, economic convergence does not exist at 
provincial level in China. This finding is consistent with previous studies which found that intra-
regional economic convergence does not exist in China. However, previous studies usually found 
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,ir tY  to be stationary for more provinces and this may due to the fact that these studies assume 
cross-section independence among 
,ir tY s. 
    Table 2.5 shows the unit root test results for the idiosyncratic component of 11 provinces when 
the PANIC approach is applied to the panel formed by the 11 provinces in the east region. The 
fact that 
e
P
$
 is not significant at the 10% level for both 1978-2007 and 1978-2012 suggests that 
there exists a unit root in the panel of the idiosyncratic component in east region. Only the 
idiosyncratic component of Guangxi is found to be stationary during 1978-2007, but it is found to 
have a unit root during 1978-2012. The idiosyncratic components for the other provinces are 
found to be nonstationary during both 1978-2007 and 1978-2012.   
    Unlike previous studies which found economic convergence for sub-regions in China, the 
empirical results for the idiosyncratic component of the provinces in east region implies that 
economic convergence does not exist in the east region.  
    Table 2.6 shows the unit root test results for the idiosyncratic component of 9 provinces while 
the PANIC approach is applied to the panel formed by the 9 provinces in the central region. 
   The result for the panel unit root test for the idiosyncratic component shows that there is a unit 
root in the panel.  No idiosyncratic component is found be to stationary in the two periods. These 
results imply economic divergence among provinces in the central region.  
    Table 2.7 shows the unit root test results for the idiosyncratic component of 8 provinces while 
the PANIC approach is applied to the panel formed by the 8 provinces in the West region. 
    Like the other two sub-regions, the empirical results for 
e
P
$
 support a unit root in the panel. 
The idiosyncratic components for Gansu and Ningxia are found to be stationary during 1978-
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2007, but nonstationary during 1978-2012. Again, economic divergence is supported by the 
empirical results in the west region.  
2.4.3. Economic divergence in China 
     Unit root test results based on the PANIC approach for the 28 provinces of China suggest that 
there is no economic convergence among the 28 provinces during 1978-2007 and 1978-2012. 
Because the 28 provinces belong to the three sub-regions, no economic convergence among the 
28 provinces also means no inter-region economic convergence. Unit root test results based on 
the PANIC for the corresponding provinces in each sub-region imply that there is no economic 
convergence among those provinces in the sub-region that they belong to.  Economic divergence 
is found in China and its three sub-regions during 1978-2007 and 1978-2012.  Unlike previous 
research which found economic divergence among regions, but found economic convergence for 
sub-regions,  this paper found economic divergence both intra-region and inter-region. Empirical 
results for the panel of whole China tell us that there is no economic convergence between 
Beijing in the east region and Yunnan in the West region (or between Shanghai in the east region 
and Anhui in the central region). Empirical results for east region suggest there is no economic 
convergence between Beijing and Guangxi, even though they are in the same sub-region, and this 
economic divergence among provinces in the same sub-region is also true for the other two sub-
regions.  
The reason that previous research usually found economic convergence intra-region may due 
to: 1) they assume cross-section independence in the data. Once cross-section dependence among 
provinces is ignored, unit root tests will over rejected the hypothesis of economic divergence.  2) 
the downward bias caused by the constant in the ADF style regression. Conventional ADF, IPS, 
and LM tests with structural breaks are all based on AR(p) process, as long as constant is include, 
there will be downward bias in least square estimates and the bias can be very severe when there 
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is high persistence.  For Equation (2.5), the OLS estimate of 0γ  will be downwardly biased away 
from zero, leading to an over rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root, and economic 
convergence is more likely to be supported. This is illustrated by the significant difference 
between the t-statistic for the conventional ADF test and the RMA-based ADF test for the 
common factors.  
2.5. Conclusion 
    The Panel Analysis of Nonstationarity in Idiosyncratic and Common components (PANIC) 
approach is applied in this paper to investigate economic convergence in China and its three sub-
regions. Under the structure of the PANIC approach, the recursive mean adjusted (RMA) method 
has been applied for the unit root test of the common factor to reduce bias. The common factor 
for China and its three sub-regions are found to be nonstationary, which implies pervasive 
nonstationarity in China’s economy. For most of the time, the idiosyncratic component for 
individual provinces are found to be nonstationary, especially during 1978-2012, only Guangxi's 
idiosyncratic component to found to be stationary.  
    Unlike previous research which found intra-regional economic convergence in China. In this 
paper, the PANIC approach with bias reduction method finds evidence in favor of economic 
divergence both intra-region and inter-region. The unit root in the common factor possibly 
implies that central government policy is not eliminating income dispersion among provinces in 
China. The nonstationary in idiosyncratic components suggests that, even without the common 
factor, economic inequality between rich and poor provinces will not narrow with the current 
economic conditions. In order to make the economic development in China to be shared more 
evenly among people in different regions, at least province-based policy is needed. According to 
the findings of this research, central government policy that targets at a sub-region that includes 
some provinces does not seem to help the economy converge at the provincial level in that            
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sub-region. The central government in China can make and implement province-based policy 
such as more investment in the infrastructure, lower taxes, better benefits for skilled workers, and 
more financial support for less developed provinces.  The central government also can help 
provinces in central and west regions of China to build up more trade connections with other 
countries and regions in the world. The more open those provinces are to international trade, the 
faster economic growth they will enjoy.  This paper shows the economic divergence in China 
during the post-reform period. Future studies can focus on the effectiveness of difference policies 
in reducing the economic inequality among provinces and regions in China.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
 
Identification and the Reflection Problem in Spatial Econometrics: 
An Application using U.S. Counties 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Applied spatial economic research is known to suffer from identification problems. In many of 
the cases, empirical research based on spatial econometric models only provide correlations of the 
key variables among spatial units but no credible information about the causal relationships in the 
economic processes (Pinkse & Slade, 2010 and Gibbons & Overman, 2012). In this paper, I put 
identification and causality at the center, while studying how employment growth of a county is 
affected by employment growth, initial fiscal policy variables and certain initial conditions of 
other counties in the same commuting zone (CZ).  
    County employment growth is very important. For the welfare of individual residents in a 
county, losing a job has a very negative impact on individual residents’ lives. Guaranteed county 
employment growth means guaranteeing the welfare of the residents in the county. The county is 
the basic geographic unit of the nation. County employment growth is the basis for national 
employment growth. Counties in the same commuting zone are thought to be in the same   
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labor market20; studying the interaction mechanism among counties in the same commuting zone 
that affects county employment growth has important theoretical and policy implications. 
Previous studies have found spillover effects of employment growth and fiscal policies at the 
county level. Khan et al. (2001) and Desmet and Fafchamps (2005) found spatial spillovers 
among county employment levels. Shuai (2010) found substantial spillover of county fiscal 
benefits associated with job creation in Virginia. But this research is based on the conventional 
Spatial-Durbin model, which suffers from serious identification issues. 
The conventional Spatial-Durbin model and related models are used in many empirical studies, 
and those models are essentially parallel with linear-in-mean neighborhood effect models (Lee 
2004, 2007). Manski (1993) has already showed that this type of model has the “reflection 
problem” which means that the model cannot provide identification of the causal effect of the 
average behavior or characteristics of a group on the behavior of the individual agent that belongs 
to that group. Unfortunately, this identification problem does not draw enough attention among 
empirical studies based on the Spatial-Durbin model and its variations. There are few studies that 
discuss the identification issue in spatial econometric models and how to carry out valid spatial 
econometric research. Pinkse and Slade (2010) discussed the problems of spatial econometrics 
that are yet unsolved and advise that new spatial econometric theory should be inspired by actual 
empirical applications, and not be directed by what appears to be the most obvious extension of 
what is currently available. Gibbons and Overman (2012) discussed the characteristics and 
identification problems of different types of spatial econometric models and argue that, in many 
cases, conventional spatial econometric approach is uninformative about the causal economic 
process at work. They suggest that future spatial econometric research should focus on “providing 
                                                           
20 Commuting zones are defined by the United State Department of Agriculture to combine counties into 
units intended to more closely reflect the geographic interrelationships between employers and labor 
supply. For more details, see http://www.ers.usda.gov. 
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credible estimates of causal processes that can guide understanding of our world, and guide 
policy makers on how to change it.”21  
In the spirit of “new spatial econometric theory that should be inspired by actual empirical 
applications” and “providing credible estimates of causal processes”, in this research, I use the 
G2SLS approach proposed by Lee (2007) and developed by Bramoullé et al. (2009) to investigate 
spillover effects of employment growth among counties in the same commuting zone and the 
spillover effects of certain initial fiscal policy variables and initial county conditions on the 
employment growth of their neighboring counties in the same commuting zone for both 2000-
2007 and 2000-2010. No spillover effects are found among employment growth of counties in the 
same commuting zone. County safety expenditures in year 1997 is found to have positive 
spillover effects on employment growth of neighboring counties in the same commuting zone. 
The county initial level of the high-tech employment share of year 2000 is found to have positive 
spillover effects on the employment growth of neighboring counties in the same commuting zone 
for the period 2000-2010. The county’s own initial log employment density is found to have 
negative effect on its employment growth for both periods.  
3.2. Identification strategy 
Following Lee (2007), assume that N counties form R commuting zones (CZs) and counties in 
the same CZ interact with each other22. Let rm  denote group size, then rm is the number of 
counties in the 
thr  CZ, and
1
R
ii
m N
=
=∑ .  For an individual county i in the thr  CZ, i interacts 
with the other ( 1rm − ) counties in the CZ. Define riM  as the peer group for county i, then riM  
                                                           
21 Gibbons and Overman, 2012. 
22A county does not have to interact with all other counties in the same CZ. For simplicity of illustrating the 
identification strategy, here it just assumes that counties interact with each other in the same CZ. 
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includes all the counties in the 
thr CZ but i. Consider the following spatial autoregressive (SAR) 
model:              
                                         1 2rr m r r r r r r r
Y l W Y X W Xα β γ δ ε= + + + +   (3.1) 
where rY  is a 1rm ×  vector of outcomes for the rm counties. rW  is an r rm m× interaction matrix 
with 
1
1
ij
r
W
m
=
−
 if i j≠ , and 
ijW =0 if i=j. In application, rW does not need to be in such a 
structure so that counties in the CZ end up having the same weight in interactions. Any rW  
matrix that is a row-normalized matrix with zeroes as the elements on its diagonal is fine. 1rX  
and  2rX  contain the characteristic variables of each county in the CZ. 1rX  and 2rX  can be the 
same or different23. mrl  is a 1rm × vector of ones, rα  represents the unobservables of the 
thr  CZ. 
Because it is possible that those unobservables may correlate with 1rX  or 2rX , rα  the so called 
“ correlated effect” are treated as fixed effects. 
2
0~ (0, )r iid Iε σ  is the error term. β  is the so 
called  “endogenous effects”, it is the structural interaction effect, it captures how the outcome of 
the agent i is influenced by the outcomes of other units in the same group. γ  is the so-called 
“individual effect”, and it captures how an individual county’s outcome is affected by its own 
characteristics. δ is the so called "contextual effect", and it captures the effects of certain 
characteristics of other counties in the 
thr  CZ on  the outcome of county i.    
Define 1 2[ , ]r r rX X X=
24 , and Equation (3.1) can be expressed equivalently in terms of 
individual county i in CZ r, 
                                                           
23 In application, 
2rX
can be a set of variable that are included in 
1r
X  
24  If there are common elements in 
1r
X  and 
2rX
, those common elements are include in 
r
X without 
duplication.  
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,2
,1
1 1
ri ri
rj rjj M j M
ri r ri ri
r r
y x
y x
m m
α β γ δ ε∈ ∈= + + + +
− −
∑ ∑
,  ( | , , ) 0ri r r rE X mε α =  (3.2) 
   The exogeneity assumption ( | , , ) 0ri r r rE X mε α =  can accommodate situations where the 
numbers of counties in CZs are endogenous. The number of counties in a given CZ may depend 
on unobserved common characteristics of the CZ, which means ( | , ) 0ri r rE X mε ≠ . Commuting 
zones were developed to be a spatial measure of the local labor market and the central objective 
of CZs was to develop such a geographic unit that better captures the economic and social 
diversity of non-metro areas. So when commuting zones are constructed, the size of the 
commuting zone—how many counties should be included in a given commuting zone—may 
depend on certain unobservable characteristics of the CZ. Model (2) allows for this type of 
correlation. Conditional on these common characteristics, the number of counties in the CZ is 
assumed to be independent of the idiosyncratic unobserved characteristics of individual county 
i: ( | , , ) 0ri r r rE X mε α = . This assumption is maintained throughout this study.  
Similar to those of a panel data regression, Equation (3.2) can have a “between” transformation 
and a “within” transformation. Equation (3.2.1) and Equation (3.2.2) represent the between and 
within transformation of Equation (3.2), respectively. 
1 2(1 ) r r rrry x xβ α γ δ ε− = + + +       (3.2.1) 
1 2,1 ,2
1
( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
Mri Mri Mriri ri ri riMri
r r
y y x x x x
m m
β γ δ ε ε− + = − − − + −
− −
       (3.2.2) 
where 
1
1 ri
rjMri j M
r
y y
m ∈
=
−
∑ , 1 ,1
1
1 ri
Mri rjj M
r
x x
m ∈
=
−
∑ , and 2 ,2
1
1 ri
Mri rjj M
r
x X
m ∈
=
−
∑  are 
means for county i’s peer group.  
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From Equation (3.2.1) we have: 
1 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
rr
r rr
y x x
α γ δ ε
β β β β= + + +− − − −        (3.2.3) 
From Equation (3.2.2) we have: 
1 2,1 ,2
( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
r r
Mri Mri Mriri ri ri riMri
r r r
m m
y y x x x x
m m m
γ δ
ε εβ β β
− −
− = − − − + −
− + − + − +
(
3.2.4) 
Obviously, it is not possible to separate the CZ fixed effect rα , individual effect γ  and 
contextual effect δ from the endogenous effect β  based on the regression Equation (3.2.3).  
     From Equation (3.2.4), when 0γβ δ+ ≠ 25, only two composite parameters: ( 1)
( 1 )
r
r
m
m
γ
β
−
− +
 and 
( 1 )rm
δ
β− +  can be recovered from this form for each group size rm . In order to identify the 
structural parameters β , γ and δ from the two composite parameters, we need at least three 
different group sizes. So variation in group size is the key to identify β ,γ and δ . In this research, 
variation in group size means variation in the number of counties that are included in different 
CZs.  When the outcome of a county is influenced by its own characteristics and the outcome and 
characteristics of other counties in the same CZ, different numbers of counties in different CZs 
means the number of the spillover channels are different in those CZs, and this leads to the 
variation in the overall spillover effects. For example, let’s assume spillover effects exists and 
assume two counties: A and B. County A is in commuting zone CZ1 that contains 4 counties, and 
county B is in  commuting zone CZ2 that contains 10 counties. As a result, the outcome of county 
                                                           
25 When 0γβ δ+ = , if there are common elements in 
1r
X  and
2r
X , then only the individual effect of those 
common elements can be identified. 
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A is influenced by the outcomes and characteristics of the other three counties in CZ1, while the 
outcome of county B is influenced by the outcomes and characteristics of the other nine counties 
in CZ2. The structural parameters β  and δ that denote the spillover effects are the same for 
county A and B. But B receives endogenous and contextual effects from nine counties while A 
does only from three counties. As a result, the overall endogenous and contextual effects that B in 
CZ2 receives are different from those received by A in CZ1.  The variation in the overall 
spillover effects leads to the identification of β ,γ and δ . 
3.3. DATA 
In this paper, my sample includes counties in the 48 US continental states. Commuting zones 
with only one county are not included.  This results in 3,039 counties in 656 Commuting zones26. 
My empirical model is: 
1ri mr s r r r r r rY l W Y X W Xα β γ δ ε= + + + +        (3.3.1) 
where riy  is the employment growth rate of county i in the 
thr  commuting zone in the given 
period. sα  is the state fixed effect. The state fixed effect is the same for counties in the same 
state, while for most commuting zones, counties in the commuting zone come from the same 
state, and even for those few commuting zones where not all counties come from the same state, 
still there are some counties from the same state, so in practice27, after the within transformation, 
                                                           
26 Independent cities in Virginia are combined with neighboring cites and/or counties to form a "new" 
county. 
27 As it will become more clear late, In practice, both side of (3.1) will time  ( )rI W−  to get the within 
transformation, and the weight in the W matrix is build upon the proportion of work flows. For those few 
commuting zones that consist of counties from different states, the weight of county i in state s for a county 
j in state t in most of the time is relative small compare to the weight of county i for those counties also in 
state s, thus after the transformation ( )*
r mr s
I W l α− is a vector with most of its element equal to zero and 
those few doesn't equal to zero has a value that is close to zero. 
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the fixed effect is eliminated. 1rx includes 5 county fiscal variables and 2 variables to control for 
knowledge spillovers. rx  includes all the variables in 1rx , 9 demographic variable, 4 education 
variables, 6 amenity variables and 2 additional control variables. The employment data are from 
BEA, county fiscal data is from US Census of Government in 1997, demographic data and 
education data are from US 2000 census. Amenity data and Rural-Urban Continuum Codes are 
from USDA ERS. For a detailed description and summary statistics of the variables, please see 
Table 3.1.  
The empirical model is applied to two periods: 2000-2007, and 2000-2010. I want to see if the 
Great Recession has changed the pattern of interactions between counties at the commuting zone 
level. The rW matrix is constructed in the following way: for a county i in commuting zone r, 
suppose that there are  im  counties in i's peer group
28. Let 
ijwf  denote the work flow from county 
i to j in year 2000. Define 
1
im
i ijj
wf wf
=
=∑ , then ijij
wf
W
wf
= , if i j≠  and j is in i's peer group in 
commuting zone r, and 
ijW =0 otherwise.  
 As a result, rW is a row-normalized matrix with zero as the element on its diagonal. Because 
the variation of the group size is the key to identification and Lee (2007) showed that smaller 
group size tends to help the identification. The characteristic of the group size in this research 
should satisfy these requirements. Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics of the group sizes.  
   The mean group size is 4.63 while the standard deviation is 2.26. So there is enough variation in 
the group size and the average group size is relatively small. The group structure of the sample in 
this research should be able to help identify the endogenous and contextual effects of interest. 
                                                           
28 im  does not have to equal the number of counties in the commuting zone minus one, which means 
county i does not have to be connected with all other counties in the same commuting zone. 
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3.4. Estimation Method 
    Multiply both sides of Equation (3.3.1) with (I-W), where I is a N N×  identical matrix: 
*
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )I W y I W Wy I W x I W Wxβ γ δ ε− = − + − + − +        (3.4.1) 
Where * ( )I Wε ε= − . 
Lee (2007) proposed two ways to consistently estimate the structural parameters in Equation 
(3.4.1): conditional maximum likelihood estimation (CML) and generalized two stage least 
square (G2SLS). The two methods all give consistent estimates of the structural parameters; the 
generalized two stage least square method imposes less restrictions on the error term.  But 
because of the way that the weight matrix W is constructed in this paper, the CMLE is not 
applicable for this research. G2SLS is used in this research to consistently estimate the 
parameters. The detailed explanation about the inapplicability of CMLE in this paper is in the 
Appendix.  
  Bramoullé et al. (2009) showed that, for the model in Equation (3.4.1), as long as 
[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  is not perfectly collinear with the regressor 1(( ) , ( ) )I W x I W Wx− − , 
then 
2
1( )I W W x−  can be used as instruments for ( )I W Wy− . If we multiply each side of 
Equation (3.4.1) by the weighting matrix W, and take the expectation with respect to x (x 
includes all the variables that are in 1x ), we can have: 
      
1
1[( ) ( ) | , ] ( ) [ ( ) ( ) )]E I W Wy x W W I W I W x I W Wxθ β γ δ−− = − − + −      (3.4.2)29 
    In Equation (3.4.2), the W matrix is a block-diagonal matrix with elements on the diagonal 
equal to zero and its non-zero elements equal to the corresponding relative size of the work flows 
                                                           
29 Because of the way W matrix is formed in this research, It can be proved that ( ) ( )I W W W I W− = − . 
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between two counties in the same commuting zone. It is clear that [( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  are 
not perfectly collinear with ( )I W x−  and 1( )I W Wx− . But the non-perfectly collinearity among 
[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ− , ( )I W x−  and 1( )I W Wx−  does not guarantee the exogeneity of 
2
1( )I W W x− . If 
2
1( )I W W x−  is not exogenous, then it cannot be used as the excluded 
instrument for ( )I W Wy− . Denote *1x =
2
1( )I W W x−  and 
*y = ( )I W y− . For any given 
observation in 
*
1x , it is the linear combination of the observations of the corresponding 
characteristic variable of all the counties in that particular commuting zone, as a result, each 
observation in 
*
1x contains the information of the corresponding characteristic variable of all the 
counties in that commuting zone. For any given observation in
*y , based on the same logic as that 
for
*
1x , it contains the information of the dependent variable of all the counties in that commuting 
zone.  As a result, if we have enough reasons to believe that 1x  is exogenous to y, we can believe 
in the exogeneity of 
*
1x  to
*y . The dependent variable y in this research is the employment 
growth rate of a given county for the period 2000-2007 or 2000-2010. The county characteristic 
variables that are included in 1x  are 5 county fiscal variables of year 1997 which are pre-
determined, and natural log of county employment density of year 2000 and the employment 
share of high-tech industry at the county level in year 2000 which are the variables to control for 
the initial conditions. There may exist commuting zone level characteristic variable in the error 
term in Equation (3.3.1) that correlate with both  the employment growth of counties in the 
commuting zone and the above 7 county level characteristic variables. Equation (3.4.2) is actually 
the deviation-from-peer-group version of Equation (3.3.1). Because the W matrix is a row-
normalized matrix, any omitted variable in the error of Equation (3.3.1) that are at the commuting 
zone level no longer exists in the error term of Equation (3.4.2). These features of the variables 
that are included in 1x  and the error term of Equation (3.4.2) gives confidence about the 
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exogeneity of 1x , and as a result, confidence in the exogeneity of the excluded instrument: 
2
1( )I W W x− . 
Based on Lee (2007), Bramoullé et al. (2009) proposed a generalized Two-Stage Least Square 
(G2SLS) procedure consists of two rounds of Two-Stage Least Square (2SLS) estimation to 
consistently estimate the parameters in Equation (3.4.2). In this research, the procedure proposed 
by Bramoullé et al. (2009) is used to identify the parameters of the empirical model. The 
following are the two rounds of this procedure: 
    1st round: In the first round 2SLS, 
2
1( )I W W x−  is used as the excluded instrument for 
( )I W Wy− , and we get estimates of the parameters of the model. Denote ( , , )θ β γ δ= , and 
let’s call the estimate of θ  that is obtained from this first round  2ˆ slsθ . 
    2nd round: The excluded instruments used in the second round 2SLS is based on 
2ˆ slsθ . The 
excluded instrument for ( )I W Wy− in the second round 2SLS is ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ− , the 
estimate of [( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  based on 2ˆ slsθ . ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  is obtained 
following Equation (3.4.2):
1
1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ] ( ) [( )( )]E I W Wy x W W I W I W x Wxθ β γ δ−− = − − + . 
Denote the estimate of θ  obtained from this round ˆLeeθ , and Lee (2007) showed that ˆLeeθ  is a 
consistent estimate of θ . 
    The exogeneity of the excluded instrument, 
2
1( )I W W x−  , in the above 1
st round has already 
been discussed. How about the exogeneity of the excluded instrument, ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ− , 
in 2nd round? Because 
1
1
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ] ( ) [( )( )]E I W Wy x W W I W I W x Wxθ β γ δ−− = − − + , based on 
the same logic as that for 
2
1( )I W W x− , There should be enough reasons to believe that those 
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variable in x  and 1x are exogenous in order for me to be confident about the exogenous of 
ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ− . Exogeneity of variables in 1x  had already been discussed. x  includes 
all 7 variable of 1x , 9 demographic variables and 4 education variables controlling for initial 
conditions and 6 amenity variables and 2 additional control variables30. The characteristics of 
these variables give confidence about the exogeneity of ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ− . From the 
above two steps, it is clear that whether ˆLeeθ  is a consistent estimate of θ  relies heavily on how 
well ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  works as the excluded instrument for ( )I W Wy− in the second 
round 2SLS. Theoretically, ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  should be a good choice as the excluded 
instrument for ( )I W Wy−  but it has to be supported by test results.  
For the purpose of comparing, I also estimate the following two models: 
    1. Hedonic OLS model without spatial lags: 
i s i iy c x ϕ ε= + + , where sc is state fixed effect. 
    2. Traditional Spatial-Durbin instrument variable (IV) model with spatial lags: 
    1s iy c Wy x Wxβ γ δ ζ= + + + + , where sc is state fixed effect, and use 2 1W x  as instrument for 
Wy . 
    Because the Spatial-Durbin IV model and the G2SLS model are all based on instrumental 
variables, weak instruments in the first regression will lead to biased estimate of the model 
parameters. How well the instruments perform in the first stage regressions should be tested. 
Table 3.3 contains important test statistics regarding how the excluded instruments perform in all 
the models. For convenience, the 1st round 2SLS in the G2SLS procedure will be referred to as 
                                                           
30 Please see section .33 of this paper for a detailed description of all the variables.  
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the 1st round 2SLS, and the 2nd round 2SLS in the G2SLS procedure will be referred to as the 2nd 
round 2SLS throughout this paper. The empirical results for key variables of the G2SLS models’ 
First-stage regressions are shown in Table 3.7 to Table 3.10. Table 3.7 and Table 3.9 contain the 
empirical results for the 1st round 2SLS for 2000-2007 and 2000-2010, respectively; Table 3.8 and 
Table 3.10 contains the empirical results for the 2nd round 2SLS for 2000-2007 and 2000-2010, 
respectively31. The “first stage F statistics” in Table 3.3 are the F statistic for the excluded 
instruments that are used in the corresponding regressions. 
   From Panel A of Table 3.3, we can see that the p-value for the Hansen-J overidentification test 
statistics are larger than 0.1 for the first stage regression of the 1st round 2SLS for both 2000-2007 
and 2000-2010. This means I do not need to worry much about the overidentification issue of the 
excluded instruments. The F statistics for the first stage of the 1st round 2SLS are less than 10 for 
both the periods 32 , while the p-value for the F-statistics are both zero. The corresponding 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-statistics are both less than the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
values based on 10% maximal IV relative bias while larger than the Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values based on 20% maximal IV relative bias33 . While those above empirical test 
statistics may suggest that the excluded instruments used in the 1st round 2SLS are not that strong, 
they still suggest that we can have confident in the overall significance of these excludes 
instruments used in the corresponding regressions. Whether the parameters in the model can be 
consistently estimated by the G2SLS procedure based heavily on how well the excluded 
instruments in the 2nd round 2SLS performs. Weak instruments can cause bias in the estimates of 
                                                           
31 Table 3.7 to Table 3.10 contains empirical results for the 7 key variables in the first stage regressions. 
The full set of empirical results for the corresponding first stage regressions is available upon request. 
32 In empirical research, with a first-stage F statistics based on the excluded instruments that is equal to or 
greater than 10, weak identification hypothesis is considered rejected with strong confidence. 
33 The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values based on 5% maximal IV relative bias, 10% maximal IV 
relative bias and 20% maximal IV relative bias are 19.86, 11.29 and 6.73, respectively. The Stock-Yogo 
weak ID test critical values are calculated based on i.i.d errors. The errors in this research are clustered in 
commuting zone level. So the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values are only for reference here.  
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the parameters in the 1st round 2SLS, but this does not necessary mean the excluded instruments 
for ( )I W Wy−  used in the 2nd round 2SLS, ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ− , that based on the estimates 
of the parameters from the 1st round 2SLS will be a bad choice. The F statistics for the first stage 
of the 2nd round 2SLS for 2000-2007 and 2000-2010 are 44.41 and 51.02, respectively. The 
corresponding Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistics is 146.77 for 2000-2007 and 130.79 for 2000-
2010, and both are significantly larger than the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values based on 
5% maximal IV relative bias. These empirical test statistics suggest that, in the 2nd round 2SLS, 
the weak instrument hypothesis is rejected with significant confidence.  
     The fact that the weak identification test statistics for the excluded instrument of the 2nd round 
2SLS is significantly larger than that for the excluded instrument of the corresponding 1st round 
2SLS may due to the reason that not all the variables in 
2
1( )I W W x−  are that strong in 
predicting ( )I W Wy− ; while ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  obtained following Equation (3.4.2) 
contains information from all the predictor variables in ( )I W x−  and 1( )I W Wx−  which 
performs well in predicting ( )I W Wy− . This is exactly the case implied by the empirical results 
shown in Table 3.7 and Table 3.9. In Panel C of Table 3.7, only 
2( )I W W−  multiply log 
employment density of year 2000 is found to be significant for 2000-2007. In Panel C of Table 
3.9, only 
2( )I W W−  multiply log employment density of year 2000 and high-tech employment 
share of year 2000 are found to be significant for 2000-2010. ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  contains 
information from all the variables that are found to be significant in Panel A and Panel B for the 
corresponding period. Panel A of both Table 3.7 and Table 3.9 shows that ( )I W−  multiply 
property tax, safety expenditure, education expenditure, and log employment density of year 2000 
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are found to be significant for both 2000-2007 and 2000-201034.  Results in Panel B of Table 3.7 
show that ( )I W W− multiply education expenditure and log employment density of year 2000 
are found to be significant for 2000-2007, while results in Panel B of Table 3.9 show that 
( )I W W− multiply property tax and log employment density of year 2000 are found to be 
significant for 2000-2010. 
    Panel B of Table 3.3 contains the test statistics for the first stage regressions of the Spatial-
Durbin model. P value for the Hansen-J overidentification test statistics are larger than 0.1 for the 
first stage regression for both 2000-2007 and 2000-2010.  For both periods, the F-statistics for the 
first stage regression are less than 10, but the p-value for the F-statistics are equal to zero. The 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic are both larger than the Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical 
values based on 10% maximal IV relative bias. According to the empirical results for the first 
stage regression of the Spatial-Durbin IV model 35 , 
2W  multiply safe expenditure and 
employment density of year 2000 are found to be significant for both 2000-2007 and 2000-2010. 
These results suggest that we can have confident in the overall significant of these excludes 
instruments used in the Spatial-Durbin IV model. 
3.5. Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results for period 2000-2007 are shown in Table 3.4. The endogenous effect is 
found to be 0.013 and not significant by the G2SLS model and is found to be -0.16 and not 
significant by the Spatial-Durbin IV model. The negative endogenous effect estimated by the 
Spatial-Durbin IV model is not surprising, it has been shown earlier in this paper that the spatial-
Durbin IV model gives biased estimation of the endogenous effect.  
                                                           
34 Except for those variables that are contained in the Panel A of the table 3.7 and  table 3.9, some other 
variables that included in ( )I W Wx− are also found to be significant, and the information of these variables 
are also included in ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ− .  
35 The empirical results for the first stage regression of the Spatial-Durbin IV model are not included in this 
paper, but available upon request.  
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For the period 2000-0007, while the empirical results based on Spatial-Durbin IV model 
suggests there may exist a positive contextual effect of 0.19 for the property tax of 1997, G2SLS 
model results show that there exists no such effect.  The results for the Spatial-Durbin model 
suggest a negative and significant contextual effect that is equal to -0.006 for the log employment 
density of year 2000 variable, while the 2GSLS model results suggest such an is effect equal to -
0.003 but not significant.  The 2GSLS model results imply that the contextual effect of safety 
expenditure of year 1997 is 1.19 and significant during 2000-2007; the more safety a county’s 
neighboring counties are at the initial of the period, the more employment growth that county can 
experience. This implies higher safety expenditure in the commuting zone benefits every county 
inside it.  
For the period 2000-2007, the results for the OLS model suggest significant individual effects 
of safety expenditures of year 1997, education expenditures of year 1997 and log employment 
density of year 2000 on county employment growth, and the estimated effects for these variables 
are -1.92, 0.28, and -0.07, respectively. Based on results for the Spatial-Durbin IV model, the 
individual effects of safety expenditure of year 1997, education expenditure of year 1997, log 
employment density of year 2000 and high-tech employment share of year 2000 are found to be 
significant with the estimated effects as -2.24, 0.22, -0.04, and -0.09, respectively. But, with an 
estimated parameter of -0.02, only the individual effect of log employment density of year 2000 
is found to be significant by the G2SLS model.  The three different models give very different 
results regarding the individual effects of the key variables of interest and their significance.  As 
what have been discussed earlier in this paper, the Spatial-Durbin IV model cannot provide 
unbiased and consistent estimates of the parameters. When there exists a contextual effect from 
safety expenditure of year 1997 on county employment growth, it is likely that it will be 
correlated with log employment density of year 2000. The OLS model does not control for this 
and the estimates of the individual effects based on the OLS are biased and not consistent. The 
 52 
   
negative individual effect of log employment density of year 2000 implies that, counties with 
higher initial level of employment density experience lower employment growth rate during 
2000-2007.  
The G2SLS model results for 2000-2007 suggest that spillover effects do not exist among the 
employment growth of counties in the same commuting zone; county safety expenditure of year 
1997 has positive spillover effects on the employment growth of other counties in the same 
commuting zone, and county’s log of employment density of year 2000 has negative effect on its 
own employment growth for the period 2000-2010.  
Table 3.5 contains the empirical results for 2000-2010. The estimated endogenous effect based 
on the G2SLS model is now 0.046 which is larger than that for 2000-2007, but it is still found to 
be not significant.  The Spatial-Durbin IV model results show an endogenous effect equal to -0.25 
and it is significant at the 5% level. A negative spillover effect of the employment growth among 
counties in the same commuting zone for 2000-2010 suggest that, during this period, counties 
will have more jobs created while their neighboring counties are losing jobs, and vice versa. This 
is not generally what is observed in the real world.  
The Spatial-Durbin IV model results imply the existence of contextual effects for sale taxes of 
year 1997 and log employment density of year 2000, and the estimated parameters for the two 
variables are 1.89 and 0.02, respectively. G2SLS model results implies that there exist no 
contextual effects for the two variables, but contextual effects are found for safety expenditure of 
year 1997, and high-tech employment share of year 2000, and the estimated effects are 3.68 and 
0.21, respectively. Same as the result for 2000-2007, county safety expenditure of year 1997 is 
found to have a positive spillover effect on the employment growth of neighboring counties in the 
same commuting zone. Unlike that for 2000-2007, the county initial level of the high-tech 
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employment share of year 2000 is now found to have positive spillover effect on the employment 
growth of neighboring counties in the same commuting zone. 
    For the period 2000-2010, results for the OLS model suggests significant individual effects of 
the education expenditure of year 1997 and log employment density of year 2000 on county 
employment growth, and the estimated effects for these variables are 0.6 and -0.04, respectively. 
Spatial-Durbin IV model results imply that the individual effects of  property tax of year 1997, 
safety expenditure of year 1997, education expenditure of year 1997 and log employment density 
of year 2000 are significant with the estimated effects as 0.46, -0.81, 1.35, and -0.03, respectively. 
Only the individual effect of log employment density of year 2000 is found to be significant by 
the G2SLS model with an estimated parameter as -0.05.  Similar to what’s shown by the 
individual effects results for 2000-2007, the estimated individual effects of the key variables and 
their significance are very different based on the three models.  But the Spatial-Durbin IV model 
results are biased and inconsistent, and when there exists contextual effects of key variables on 
county employment growth, the OLS results are biased and not consistent. Based on the G2SLS 
result, like that for 2000-2007, county’s log employment density of year 2000 is found to have a 
negative effect on its own employment growth rate for the period 2000-2010.  
The G2SLS model results for 2000-2007 and 2000-2010 suggest that there exist no spillover 
effects among the employment growth of counties in the same commuting zone. A county’s 
safety expenditure of year 1997 has positive spillover effects on other counties’ employment 
growth for both periods, while the estimated effect for 2000-2010 is larger than that for 2000-
2007. A county’s own initial log employment density is found to have negative effect on its 
employment growth for both periods.  
Comparing the empirical results of the Spatial-Durbin IV model and the G2SLS model for both 
periods, it is clear that, in this research, the Spatial-Durbin IV model produces downwardly- 
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biased estimates of endogenous effects and biased estimates of contextual effects and individual 
effects of key variables and their significance. The Spatial-Durbin IV model cannot provide 
credible information about the causal relationship in the economy process in this research. The 
consistent estimates of the parameters based on the G2SLS model are highly likely to be more 
reliable.  
6. Monte Carlo Simulation 
Lee (2007) showed that the identification of the endogenous effect and contextual effects relies 
on the structure of the data: the number of groups, the average group size, and the variation of the 
group sizes. As I have shown before, the characteristics of group structure in this research match 
the requirements well. But how the group structure in this research performs in estimating the 
model parameters in this research still needs to be investigated. Monte Carlo Simulation is 
applied to show how the structure of the data works in estimating the model parameters.  
In the Monte Carlo Simulation, the actual weight matrix W from the data is used, and the 
sample size is fixed at 3039. This is to keep the interaction structure of the real data. In order to 
reduce computing time and without losing generality,  except for the endogenous effect, I only 
simulate the contextual effects and individual effects of property tax, highway expenditure, safety 
expenditure, education expenditure, sale tax , log employment density, and High-tech 
employment share. I assume these variables follow a normal distribution and calibrate the 
moments of them according to the sample of this research: property tax with 0.0314 as mean and 
0.0296 as variance , highway expenditure with 0.0085 as mean and  0.01145 as variance, safety 
expenditure with 0.00624 as mean and 0.0039 as variance, education expenditure with 0.0574 as 
mean and 0.0226 as variance, sale tax with 0.00368 as mean and 0.00515 as variance, 
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Employment density with 60.4 as mean and 867.87636 as variance and then log employment 
density is based on the natural log of it, and High-tech employment share with 0.0571 as mean 
and  0.067 as variance. According to the moments of the residuals that are obtained after the 
G2SLS for 2000-2010, the error term is generated by a normal distribution with mean equal -
7.2*
1110−  and variance equal  0.1104. 
The endogenous effect, contextual effects and individual effects are set equal to those 
estimated by the G2SLS for 2000-2010. The endogenous effect is set to be 0.046. The contextual 
effects of property tax, highway expenditure, safety expenditure, education expenditure, sale tax, 
log employment density, and High-tech employment share are set to be -0.57, -0.38, 5.68,   -0.53, 
0.82, -0.01 and 0.21, respectively; while the individual effects of these variables are set to be -
0.06, -0.29, 0.99, 0.28, -0.27, -0.05 and 0.03, respectively. The dependent variable y is generated 
from the reduced-form equation in deviation form. Then the model parameters are estimated by 
both Spatial-Durbin with IV and G2SLS. The Monte Carlo Simulation is carried out for 1000 
times, then the mean of the estimated parameters and their standard deviation from the 1000 
replicates are calculated. 
Table 3.6 contains the results based on the Monte Carlo Simulation. The mean value of the 
estimated endogenous effect from the G2SLS is 0.051, with a standard deviation of 0.09, while 
it’s 0.009 with a standard deviation of 0.12 from the Spatial-Durbin with IV.  The 0.05 mean 
value from the G2SLS is close to the 0.046 real value, while 0.009 is significantly smaller than 
0.046.  This is not a surprising result, because the G2SLS estimate of the endogenous effect is 
consistent while the Spatial-Durbin IV estimate of the endogenous effect is biased. For the 
contextual effects, the mean values of estimated parameters from G2SLS are closer to the actual 
values than those based on the Spatial-Durbin with IV. The dispersion between the mean value of 
                                                           
36 Before it is taken natural log of, the employment density of  year 2000 variable in the sample has an 
average of 60.4 and a variance of 867.876. 
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the contextual effects for highway expenditure and safety expenditure based on the simulation of 
Spatial-Durbin IV model and their true value are significantly larger than that for the contextual 
effects of other variables. The means  of the individual effects of the 7 variables based on the two 
models are both close to their true value, and their corresponding variance based on  the two 
models are very close. The simulation results shows that, based on group interaction structure of 
the sample in this research, the Spatial-Durbin IV model generally cannot provide consistent 
estimate of the endogenous and contextual effects of certain key variables, while the G2SLS 
model is highly likely to provide credible and consistent estimates of the endogenous effect and 
contextual effects of key variables.  
7. Conclusion 
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first empirical application of a new G2SLS 
approach proposed by Lee (2007) and developed by Bramoullé et al. (2009) to investigate 
spillover effects of employment growth among counties in the same commuting zone and the 
spillover effects of certain initial fiscal policy variables and initial conditions of counties on the 
employment growth of their neighboring counties in the same commuting zone. No evidence of 
endogenous effects are found. A positive contextual effect is found for safety expenditure of year 
1997 in both 2000-2007 and 2000-2010 and for the high-tech employment share of year 2000 for 
the period 2000-2010. Initial log employment density of a county is found to lower its own 
employment growth for both 2000-2007 and 2000-2010. Counties in the same commuting zone 
are thought to be in the same local labor market; it is reasonable to assume that there should exist 
spillover effects of county employment growth. But the findings of this paper suggest that, it is 
likely that there exist no employment spillover effects among counties in the same commuting 
zone. It is possible that there actually exist no such spillover effects among counties in the same 
commuting zone. Another possibility is that commuting zone may be not an appropriate way to 
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define local labor market, so the interaction among the employment growth of counties in the 
same commuting zone is not strong enough.  
    In terms of public policy, the significant contextual effect of initial safety expenditure suggest 
that, if one county increase safety expenditure, other counties that interact with it in the same 
commuting zone will have higher employment growth rate. The positive contextual effect of 
initial high-tech employment share implies that, county employment growth is likely to benefit 
from the knowledge spillover that it might receive from its neighboring counties in the same 
commuting zone.  
     Theory and the Monte Carlo simulation in this paper suggest that the Spatial-Durbin IV model 
may not be a good choice for certain empirical spatial econometric applications. Empirical 
research based on the conventional Spatial-Durbin IV model may simply find the correlations 
between different variables instead of identifying the causality relationships in the economic 
processes. Instead of taking the spillover effects among spatial units for granted, empirical spatial 
research should focus on getting credible identification on the model parameters. The novel 
G2SLS procedure used in this study is based on the weighted-spatial-difference among spatial 
units in the same group and makes use of the variation in group size to help identify the model 
parameters. It does not suffer from certain serious identification issues that conventional Spatial-
Durbin IV models have. Empirical spatial econometric research that is serious about the 
identification of causality in the economic processes should consider this G2SLS procedure over 
the conventional Spatial-Durbin IV model.  
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APPENDICES 
 
 
A.1 Why CMLE is not applicable  
    Multiply both sides of Equation (3.3.1) with (I-W), where I is a N N×  identical matrix: 
*
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )I W y I W Wy I W x I W Wxβ γ δ ε− = − + − + − +        (A.1.1) 
Where * ( )I Wε ε= − . Since β  is a parameter, we have: 
1
1( ) ( ) [( )( )]I W y I W I W x Wx vβ γ δ−− = − − + +        (A.1.2) 
Where 
1 *( )v I Wβ ε−= − . Because * ( )I Wε ε= − , we have 1( ) ( )v I W I Wβ ε−= − − .  
Denote riv  as the error term for county i in commuting zone r in Equation (A.1.2). Now, for 
different riv ( i=1, 2.. rm ) that belongs to different counties in the same commuting zone r, riv s 
are not i.i.d. any more. There is a joint distribution ( )r rf v  for all the riv  ( i=1, 2.. rm ) in the 
same commuting zone r.  For any riv  and jiv , as long as r ≠  j, riv  and jiv  are still independent. 
As a results, the joint distributions ( )r rf v ( r=1,2,..R) are independent among different 
commuting zones.   
The variance-covariance matrix rΣ for riv ( i=1, 2.. rm ) in each commuting zone r is 
'*r rv v , 
so rΣ =
2 1 1( ) ( )(( ) ( )) 'r r r r r r r rI W I W I W I Wσ β β− −− − − − . Where rI  is an r rm m×  
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identity matrix, rW is the weight matrix for commuting zone r.  The riv ( i=1, 2.. rm ) in each 
commuting zone r are jointly Gaussian, and ( )r rf v  is the multivariate Gaussian distribution for 
them: 
* * ' 1 * *
1
2
1 1
( ) exp ( ) ( )
2
(2 )
r r r r r r r
r
r
f v y x y x
pi
−
 
= − − Σ − 
 Σ
       (A.1.3) 
Where rΣ is the determinant of rΣ ,
* ( )r r r ry I W y= − , and 1, 2,( ... ) 'rr r r rmy y y y= . 
* 1
r,1( ) [( )( )]r r r r r r rx I W I W x W xβ γ δ−= − − + ,where 
1, 2,(x ...x ) 'rr r r rmx x= , ,1,1 1,1, 2,1,(x ...x ) 'rr r r rmx x= .  Because, as long as r ≠  j,  ( )r rf v  and  
( )j jf v  are independent, the likelihood function for Equation (A.1.3) can be expressed as: 
* * ' 1 * *
, 1
1 2
1 1
( ) exp ( ) ( )
2
(2 )
R
n w r r r r r
rr
L y x y xα
pi
−
=
 
= − − Σ − 
 Σ
∏       (A.1.4) 
where
' ' 2 '( , , , )α β γ δ σ= . In Lee (2007), the weighting matrix rW  is an r rm m× interaction 
matrix with 
1
1
ij
r
W
m
=
−
 if i j≠ , and 
ijW =0 if i=j. If all the rW , r=1,2,…R, are in such a 
structure, Lee (2007) showed that there exists a very formalized expression of Equation (A.1.2), 
and results in an unique formalized expression of
1
r
−Σ , and 
1
2Σ . Eventually, there exists a 
generalized solution for the log-likelihood function.In this paper, rW is defined based on the 
relative size of work flow, which means the structure of rW in this paper is quite different from 
that defined in Lee (2007). It is not possible to solve for 
1
r
−Σ , and 
1
2Σ in this paper, so CML 
estimator is not applicable in this research.  
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A.2 Tables 
Table1.1: Summary statistics for price indexes for years 2000, 2006, and 2011 
 Std. Dev. Min Max 
2000    
Rent-based Price index 9.3 85.7 141.2 
Quality-adjusted Gross 
Rents 
19.2 70.8 185.9 
Non-housing price 6.2 88.9 134.4 
2006    
Rent-based Price index 11.6 82.1 149.3 
Quality-adjusted Gross 
Rents 
24.9 64.1 196.2 
Non-housing price 6.9 87.3 130.1 
2011    
Rent-based Price index 10.9 81.4 137.9 
Quality-adjusted Gross 
Rents 
24.1 65.3 192.4 
Non-housing price 6.9 83.6 124.3 
     Note: Un-weighted mean is normalized to 100 
 
Table 1.2: Empirical results based on OLS for all workers in years 2000, 2006, and 2011 
 2000 2006 2011 
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.636*** 
(0.049) 
0.782*** 
 (0.044) 
0.756*** 
 (0.062) 
Significantly different from 
1? (Y/N) 
aY  aY  aY  
N 1,036,922 196,449 213,904 
2R  0.449 0.457 0.457 
Note: Cluster standard error in parentheses. *** denotes significant at 1% level.  a denotes significant at 1% level. 
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Table 1.3: Empirical Results based on OLS for education groups in years 2000, 2006, and 2011 
 
Less than 
High School 
High School 
Some 
College 
College 
and above 
Panel A: 2000 
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.497*** 
(0.071) 
0.671*** 
(0.053) 
0.683*** 
(0.062) 
0.598*** 
(0.049) 
Significantly different from 
1? (Y/N) 
aY  aY  aY  aY  
N 197,244 260,515 324,522 254,641 
2R  0.424 0.447 0.454 0.46 
Panel B: 2006 
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.597*** 
(0.059) 
0.755*** 
(0.044) 
0.874*** 
(0.053) 
0.85*** 
(0.061) 
Significantly different from 
1? (Y/N) 
aY  aY  bY  bY  
N 30,557 53,015 59,465 53,412 
2R  0.441 0.454 0.457 0.466 
Panel C: 2011 
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.553*** 
(0.058) 
0.619*** 
(0.059) 
0.813*** 
(0.068) 
0.869*** 
(0.067) 
Significantly different from 
1? (Y/N) 
aY  aY  aY  cY  
N 29,515 52,193 68,848 63,348 
2R  0.443 0.453 0.455 0.466 
Note: Cluster standard error by CBSA/CSA in parentheses. *** denotes significant at 1% level.  a denotes significant at 
1% level, b denotes significant at 5% level, and c denotes significant at 10% level. 
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Table 1.4: Empirical results based on 2SLS for all workers in years 2000, 2006, 2011 
 2000 2006 2011 
Second Stage results    
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.796*** 
(0.062) 
0.864*** 
(0.05) 
0.826*** 
(0.059) 
Significantly different from 1? 
(Y/N) 
aY  aY  aY  
N 1,017,736 196,449 213,904 
2R  0.449 0.457 0.457 
First Stage results    
Corresponding Lagged log gross 
rent 
0.42*** 
(0.033) 
0.45*** 
(0.018) 
0.425*** 
(0.019) 
Partial 2R of Excluded Instrument 0.574 0.87 0.869 
P value for Anderson-Rubin Wald 0 0 0 
 Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat. 182.2 21336 15740.4 
Note: Cluster standard error in parentheses. *** denotes significant at 1% level. a denotes significant at 1% level. 
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Table 1.5: Empirical results based on 2SLS for education groups in years 2000, 2006, and 2011 
 
Less than 
high school 
High school Some college 
College  
and above 
Panel A:2000 
Second Stage results     
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.634*** 
(0.099) 
0.857*** 
(0.071) 
0.917*** 
(0.075) 
0.697*** 
(0.057) 
Significantly different from 1? 
(Y/N) 
aY  bY  N aY  
N 194,153 254,915 317,533 251,135 
2R  0.424 0.447 0.454 0.46 
First Stage results     
Log gross rent, 1990 
0.386*** 
(0.034) 
0.418*** 
(0.03) 
0.418*** 
(0.032) 
0.44*** 
(0.038) 
Partial  
2R  of Excluded 
Instrument 
0.528 0.588 0.573 0.593 
P value for Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test 
0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat. 143.1           233.5 194.5 148.4 
 Panel B:2006 
Second Stage results     
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.636*** 
(0.066) 
0.815*** 
(0.051) 
0.969*** 
(0.06) 
0.9*** 
(0.071) 
Significantly different from 1? 
(Y/N) 
aY  aY  N N 
N 30,557 53,015 59,465 53,412 
2R  0.441 0.454 0.457 0.466 
First Stage results     
Log gross rent,2005 
0.439*** 
(0.018) 
0.449*** 
(0.017) 
0.451*** 
(0.018) 
0.459*** 
(0.018) 
Partial 
2R  of Excluded Instrument 0.854 0.863 0.86 0.89 
P value for Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test 
0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat. 12927.2 20206.2 18885.7 19673.6 
 
Panel C:2011     
Second Stage results     
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.626*** 
(0.068) 
0.67*** 
(0.066) 
0.91*** 
(0.077) 
0.96*** 
(0.079) 
Significantly different from 1? 
(Y/N) 
aY  aY  N N 
N 29,515 52,193 68,848 63,348 
2R  0.443 0.453 0.455 0.466 
First Stage results     
Log gross rent,2010 
0.425*** 
(0.02) 
0.43*** 
(0.019) 
0.427*** 
(0.02) 
0.424*** 
(0.018) 
Partial  
2R of Excluded Instrument 0.861 0.862 0.86 0.886 
P value for Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test 
0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat. 12212.2 15891.9        18022.9          12426.2 
Note: Cluster standard error in parentheses. *** denotes significant at 1% level.  a denotes significant at 1% level, and 
b denotes significant at 5% level. 
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Table 1.6: Empirical results based on group-specific weights and 2SLS for all workers in years 
2000, 2006 and 2011 
 2000 2006 2011 
Second Stage results    
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.823***  
(0.074)  
0.982***  
(0.14)  
0.946***  
(0.147)  
Significantly different from 1? 
(Y/N) 
bY  N N 
N 1,017,736 196,449 213,904 
2R  0.449 0.456 0.456 
First Stage results    
Corresponding Lagged log gross 
rent 
0.405***  
(0.036)  
0.398***  
(0.056)  
0.371***  
(0.051)  
Partial 2R of Excluded Instrument 0.374 0.443 0.372 
P value for Anderson-Rubin Wald 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat. 144.1 2607.6 2320 
Note: Cluster standard error in parentheses. *** denotes significant at 1% level. b denotes significant at 5% level. 
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Table 1.7: Empirical results based on group-specific weights and 2SLS for education groups in 
years 2000, 2006, and 2011 
 
Less than 
high school 
High school Some college 
College  
and above 
Panel A:2000 
Second Stage results     
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.647*** 
(0.108) 
0.889*** 
(0.089) 
0.958*** 
(0.09) 
0.717*** 
(0.061) 
Significantly different from 1? 
(Y/N) 
 
N N 
 
N 194,153 254,915 317,533 251,135 
2R  0.424 0.446 0.454 0.46 
First Stage results     
Log gross rent, 1990 
0.378*** 
(0.038) 
0.403*** 
(0.03) 
0.4*** 
(0.034) 
0.43*** 
(0.038e) 
Partial  
2R  of Excluded 
Instrument 
0.342 0.362 0.368 0.41 
P value for Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test 
0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat. 108.6 156.7 151.3 136.8 
 Panel B:2006 
Second Stage results     
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.685*** 
(0.112) 
0.938*** 
(0.155) 
1.11*** 
(0.154) 
1.03*** 
(0.184) 
Significantly different from 1? 
(Y/N) 
aY  N N N 
N 30,557 53,015 59,465 53,412 
2R  0.441 0.454 0.456 0.465 
First Stage results     
Log gross rent,2005 
0.407*** 
(0.056) 
0.342*** 
(0.067) 
0.393*** 
(0.05) 
0.4*** 
(0.06) 
Partial 
2R  of Excluded Instrument 0.488 0.306 0.449 0.417 
P value for Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test 
0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat. 980.7 1629.3 1668.2 2103.9 
 
Panel C:2011     
Second Stage results     
Log Rent-based Price index 
0.682*** 
(0.122) 
0.769*** 
(0.125) 
1.01*** 
(0.141) 
1.13*** 
(0.197) 
Significantly different from 1? 
(Y/N) 
bY  cY  N N 
N 29,515 52,193 68,848 63,348 
2R  0.443 0.452 0.455 0.465 
First Stage results     
Log gross rent,2010 
0.39*** 
(0.058) 
0.37*** 
(0.05) 
0.374*** 
(0.046) 
0.361*** 
(0.052) 
Partial  
2R of Excluded Instrument 0.418 0.368 0.403 0.326 
P value for Anderson-Rubin Wald 
test 
0 0 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F stat. 1105.4 1362.6 1701.5 1870.8 
Note: Cluster standard error in parentheses. *** denotes significant at 1% level.  a denotes significant at 1% level, b 
denotes significant at 5% level, and c denotes significant at 10% level. 
aY aY
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Table 2.1: Cross-section dependence (CD) test results 
Area CD test P_value 
China -2.39 0.017 
East region -2.97 0.03 
Central region -3.55 0 
West region -4.23 0 
Note: CD test denotes Pesaran's (2007) test statistic with the null hypothesis of cross-section independence 
 
 
Table 2.2: Information criteria results 
No. of 
common 
factors 
China East region Central region West region 
IC1 IC2 IC1 IC2 IC1 IC2 IC1 IC2 
1 -6.592 -6.553 -7.212 -7.017 -7.717 -7.519 -8.291 -8.095 
2 -6.581  -6.502  -7.025  -6.784  -6.942  -6.81  -7.858  -7.695  
3 -6.575  -6.458  -6.821  -6.756  -7.234  -7.069  -7.602  -7.471  
4 -6.58  -6.424  -6.791  -6.753  -6.745  -6.619  -7.311  -7.213  
5 -6.588  -6.392  -6.918  -6.857  -6.685  -6.646  -7.115  -7.049  
6 -6.565  -6.33  -6.857  -6.757  -6.605  -6.572  -6.939  -6.906  
*K  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  
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Table 2.3: Unit root test results for common factor 
Areas 
1978-2007 1978-2012 
ADF                  
t-statistic 
RMA-ADF        
t-statistic 
ADF                  
t-statistic 
RMA-ADF         
t-statistic 
China -1.279 -0.364 -1.413 -0.483 
East region -1.776* -0.589 -1.596* -0.718 
Central region -0.985 -0.096 -1.453 -0.629 
West region -2.442** -1.01 -1.846* -1.219 
Note: * and ** denotes significant at 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.4: Unit root test results for idiosyncratic components for China 
Provinces 
1978-2007 1978-2012 
ADF t-statistic ADF t-statistic 
Beijing -0.15 2.79 
Tianjing -0.57 -0.34 
Hebei -0.51 -1.02 
Liaoling 0.93 -0.03 
Shanghai 0.77 1.28 
Jiangsu 1.93 1.69 
Zhejiang 1.92 0.87 
Shandong 4.14 1.05 
Fujian 1.24 1.43 
Guangdong 0.80 -0.26 
Guangxi -4.77*** -3.27** 
Shanxi -3.42** -1.96 
Inner Mongolia 2.20 2.19 
Jilin -2.11 -1.16 
Heilongjiang 1.50 1.47 
Anhui -2.06 -2.18 
Jiangxi -0.62 -0.91 
Henan 2.12 1.28 
Hubei -0.76 -1.67 
Hunan 0.10 -0.49 
Sichuan 1.01 -0.80 
Guizhou -1.81 -1.79 
Yunnan -1.11 -1.29 
Shaaxi 0.47 1.67 
Gansu 1.35 1.80 
Qinghai 1.64 1.38 
Ningxia 0.61 -0.43 
XinJiang -0.61 -0.72 
e
P
$
 0.67 0.25 
Note: * *and *** denotes significant at 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 2.5: Unit root test results for idiosyncratic component for east region 
Provinces 
1978-2007 1978-2012 
ADF t-statistic ADF t-statistic 
Beijing 2.47 0.04 
Tianjing -0.76 -0.52 
Hebei -2.10 -1.94 
Liaoling -0.74 0.47 
Shanghai 0.89 0.78 
Jiangsu 1.22 0.74 
Zhejiang 0.67 1.33 
Shandong 2.61 2.91 
Fujian 1.01 0.59 
Guangdong -0.34 0.42 
Guangxi -2.84* -2.37 
e
P
$
 -0.57 0.12 
Note: * denotes significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Table 2.6: Unit root test results for the idiosyncratic component for the Central region 
Provinces 
1978-2007 1978-2012 
ADF t-statistic ADF t-statistic 
Shanxi 0.04 -0.20 
Inner Mongolia -1.12 -1.09 
Jilin 0.21 0.32 
Heilongjiang -0.09 0.38 
Anhui -1.28 -1.55 
Jiangxi -1.00 -0.34 
Henan 1.04 0.01 
Hubei 0.53 0.88 
Hunan 0.09 -0.18 
e
P
$
 -1.29 -1.7 
 
 
 75 
 
Table 2.7: Unit root test results for idiosyncratic component for the West region 
Provinces 
1978-2007 1978-2012 
ADF t-statistic ADF t-statistic 
Sichuan -1.38 -1.22 
Guizhou 0.29 -0.11 
Yunnan -0.66 -0.17 
Shaaxi 0.75 0.54 
Gansu -2.69* -1.82 
Qinghai -1.41 -1.57 
Ningxia -3.23** -2.36 
XinJiang -0.04 -0.33 
e
P
$
 1.53 1.01 
Note: * and **denotes significant at 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3.1: Description and summary statistics of data 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. 
Dependent variable 
emp_grow0007 employment growth 2000-2007 3039 0.066 0.145 
emp_grow0010 employment growth 2000-2010 3039 0.045 0.17 
County Fiscal Variables 1997 (Share of personal income) 
Property tax Revenue from property tax 3039 0.031 0.03 
Highway 
expenditure 
Expend. on highway 3039 0.009 0.011 
Safety expenditure 
Expend. on public safety(police + fire 
protection) 
3039 0.006 0.004 
Education 
expenditure 
Expend. on education 3039 0.057 0.023 
Sales tax Revenue from sales tax 3039 0.004 0.005 
Knowledge spillover variables (2000) 
Log Emp. Density 
2000 
Natural log of employment density 
2000 (Thousand person per squared 
kilometer) 
3039 2.103 1.658 
High_tech emp. 
Share 2000 
Employment share of high-tech 
industry37 of year 2000 
3039 0.057 0.067 
Demographic Variables (2000) 
African 
Percent population of African 
American   
3039 0.286 2.853 
Native 
Percent population of Native 
American   
3039 0.037 0.768 
Asianpacific Percent population of Asian  3039 0.027 0.414 
other Percent population of other races  3039 0.063 0.705 
Hispanic Percent population of Hispanic 3039 0.159 1.769 
Married 
Percent population (15years over) that 
are married   
3039 0.605 0.053 
Female Percent population that are female   3039 0.505 0.019 
disable 
Percent Civilian non-institutionalized 
population 16 to 64 years with a work 
disability 
3039 0.112 0.03 
lingiso 
Percent household with linguistic 
isolation prob. 
3039 0.014 0.022 
                                                           
37 High technology industries are chosen according to the BEA high-tech industry definition. For certain 
industries, the US census data only show the number of establishments and the employment group those 
establishments belong to. For these industries, employment is calculated as the product of  the number of 
establishments with the mean employment of the employment group that those establishments belong to.  
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Table 3.1 continued. 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. 
Education Variables (2000) 
High-school 
Percent population 25 years and over that 
are high school graduates 
3039 0.348 0.065 
Some college 
Percent population 25 years and over that 
attend college but without a bachelor's 
degree 
3039 0.204 0.044 
Associate 
Percent population 25 years and over that 
have an associate degree 
3039 0.057 0.02 
Bachelor 
Percent population 25 years and over 
with education attainment equal or higher 
than a bachelor's degree 
3039 0.164 0.076 
Amenity Variables 
Jantemp Mean temperature for January, 1941-71 3039 32.942 12.055 
Jansun 
Mean hours of sunshine for January, 
1941-71 
3039 151.479 33.142 
Julytem Mean temperature for July, 1941-71 3039 75.914 5.337 
Julyhumid Mean relative humidity for July, 1941-71 3039 56.136 14.522 
topography 
Topography score ranging from 1-21, 
where 1 represents flat plain and 21 
represent most mountainous land 
3039 8.84 6.576 
Additional Control Variables 
RC2003 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes 2003 3039 5.111 2.673 
Navigable river 
distance 
distance to navigable river (KM) 3039 245.934 242.766 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics of group sizes 
 Obs Mean Std.  Min Max 
Group size 656 4.63 2.26 2 17 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: F test stat., weak instrument test stat., and overidentification test stat. for first stage 
regressions for 2000-2007 and 2000-2010. 
 2000-2007 2000-2010 
Panel A: G2SLS Procedure 
1st round 2SLS :  
2
1( )I W W x−  as excluded instrument for ( )I W Wy−  
First stage F stat.  5.41 6.62 
P value for first stage F stat. 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F stat.       7.48 8.67 
Hansen-J test stats.  9.81 4.89 
P value for Hansen-J test 0.13 0.56 
2nd round 2SLS :  
ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−  as excluded instrument for ( )I W Wy−  
First stage F stat.  44.41 51.02 
P value for first stage F stat. 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 
stat. 
146.77 130.79 
Panel B: Spatial-Durbin IV  
2
1W x  as excluded instrument for Wy  
First stage F stat.  7.7 9.18 
P value for first stage F stat. 0 0 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F 
stat.     
11.48 12.75 
Hansen-J test stats. 7.35 3.11 
P value for Hansen-J test 0.29 0.79 
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Table 3.4: Empirical results for 2000-2007 
 Hedonic OLS 
Spatial-Durbin 
IV 
G2SLS 
 Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Endogenous effect   -0.16 -1.09 0.013 0.1 
Contextual effect 
Property tax 1997   0.19* 1.67 -0.24 -0.84 
Highway expenditure 
1997 
  0.08 0.36 -0.76 -1.27 
Safety expenditure 1997   -0.59 -0.93 1.19* 1.74 
Education expenditure 
1997 
  -0.1 -0.43 -0.24 -0.64 
Sale tax 1997   2 1.14 1.15 0.54 
Log Emp. density 2000   -0.006*** -3.38 -0.003 -1.09 
High-tech emp. Share 
2000 
  0.01 0.11 0.03 0.31 
Individual effect 
Property tax 1997 -0.1 -0.93 -0.08 -0.42 -0.29 -1.49 
Highway expenditure 
1997 
-0.32 -1.18 -0.33 -1.03 -0.87 -1.54 
Safety expenditure 1997 -1.92* -1.79 -2.24** -2.3 -1.27 -0.79 
Education expenditure 
1997 
0.28* 1.84 0.22*** 2.72 0.12 0.54 
Sale tax 1997 0.91 1 1.42 1.54 0.82 0.69 
Log Emp. density 2000 -0.07*** -3.69 -0.04* -1.78 -0.02*** -3.74 
High-tech emp. Share 
2000 
-0.05 -1.48 -0.09* -1.86 -0.06 -1.37 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The t-statistics are 
based on residuals clustered over commuting zone. 
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Table 3.5: Empirical results for 2000-2010 
 Hedonic OLS 
Spatial-
Durbin IV 
G2SLS 
 Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. 
Endogenous effect   -0.25** -2.29 0.046 0.39 
Contextual effect 
Property tax 1997   0.5 1.43 -0.57 -1.32 
Highway expenditure 
1997 
  0.19 0.63 -0.38 -0.62 
Safety expenditure 
1997 
  1.26 0.92   3.68* 1.79 
Education expenditure 
1997 
  0.38 1.35 -0.53 -1.25 
Sale tax 1997   1.89* 1.75 0.82 0.32 
Log Emp. density 2000   0.02*** 3.71 -0.01 -1.33 
High-tech emp. Share 
2000 
  0.18 1.18    0.21* 1.75 
Individual effect 
Property tax 1997 0.2 1.45 0.46** 2.4 -0.06 -0.31 
Highway expenditure 
1997 
0.14 0.69 0.33 1.57 -0.29 -0.51 
Safety expenditure 
1997 
-0.89 -0.83 -0.81* -1.76 0.99 0.53 
Education expenditure 
1997 
0.6*** 3.03 1.35*** 4.52 0.28 1.1 
Sale tax 1997 -0.1 -0.8 0.09 0.65 -0.27 -0.17 
Log Emp. density 2000 -0.04*** -8.89 -0.03* -1.69 -0.05*** -6.39 
High-tech emp. Share 
2000 
-0.01 -0.75 0.06 0.61 0.03 0.33 
Note: *,**, and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. T-stat. based on residuals 
cluster over commuting zone. 
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Table 3.6: Monte Carlo Simulation results (1000 replicates). 
 G2SLS Spatial-Durbin IV 
 Mean Std. Dev.   Mean Std. Dev. 
Endogenous effect 0.05 0.07   0.009 0.11 
Contextual effect 
Property tax 1997 -0.57 0.16   -0.55 0.15 
Highway expenditure 1997 -0.36 0.32   -0.47 0.32 
Safety expenditure 1997 5.51 1.27   4.86 1.22 
Education expenditure 
1997 
-0.54 0.24   -0.5 0.23 
Sale tax 1997 0.81 0.75   0.73 0.71 
Log Emp. density 2000 -0.11 0.01  -0.01 0.01 
High-tech emp. Share 2000 0.21 0.07   0.31 0.06 
Individual effect 
Property tax 1997 -0.06 0.09   -0.06 0.11 
Highway expenditure 1997 -0.26 0.22   -0.29 0.23 
Safety expenditure 1997 0.96 0.67   0.94 0.66 
Education expenditure 
1997 
0.27 0.12   0.28 0.13 
Sale tax 1997 -0.28 0.51   -0.27 0.5 
Log Emp. density 2000 -0.05 0.02   -0.05 0.02 
High-tech emp. Share 2000 0.03 0.04   0.03 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 82 
 
Table 3.7: First-stage results for 1st round 2SLS in the G2SLS procedure for period 2000-2007 
 Coefficient t-stat. 
Panel A: ( )I W−  multiply 
Property tax 1997      0.36*** 3.00 
Highway expenditure 1997                       -0.34 -1.62 
Safety expenditure 1997   -1.75** -2.51 
Education expenditure 1997     -0.42*** -3.05 
Sale tax 1997                       -0.67 -0.81 
Log Emp. Density 2000      0.02*** 4.06 
High-tech emp. Share 2000                        0.05 1.34 
Panel B: ( )I W W− multiply 
Property tax 1997                        0.28 0.55 
Highway expenditure 1997                       -0.17 -0.15 
Safety expenditure 1997                       -2.40 -0.70 
Education expenditure 1997   -0.84** -2.31 
Sale tax 1997                        0.65 0.17 
Log Emp. Density 2000  0.01* 1.69 
High-tech emp. Share 2000                        0.17 1.29 
Panel C: 
2( )I W W−  multiply 
Property tax 1997                       -0.17 -0.33 
Highway expenditure 1997                        0.29 0.29 
Safety expenditure 1997                        5.83 1.22 
Education expenditure 1997                       -0.38 -0.45 
Sale tax 1997                        2.86 0.44 
Log Emp. Density 2000      0.02*** 3.59 
High-tech emp. Share 2000                        0.17 1.13 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. T-stat. based on 
residuals cluster over commuting zone. 
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Table 3.8: First-stage results for 2nd  round 2SLS in the G2SLS procedure for period 2000-2007 
 Coefficient t-stat. 
Panel A: ( )I W−  multiply 
Property tax 1997      0.24*** 2.80 
Highway expenditure 1997 -0.29* -1.67 
Safety expenditure 1997    -1.41** -2.53 
Education expenditure 1997                       -0.10 -1.03 
Sale tax 1997                       -0.44 -0.64 
Log Emp. Density 2000       0.01*** 3.09 
High-tech emp. Share 2000 0.02 0.71 
Panel B: ( )I W W− multiply: 
Property tax 1997    0.34* 1.72 
Highway expenditure 1997 -0.26 -1.09 
Safety expenditure 1997       -7.57*** -3.94 
Education expenditure 1997 -0.50 -1.41 
Sale tax 1997 -2.61 -1.02 
Log Emp. Density 2000 -0.01 -1.57 
High-tech emp. Share 2000  0.07 0.93 
ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−       0.5*** 6.66 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. T-stat. based on 
residuals cluster over commuting zone. 
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Table 3.9: First-stage results for 1st round 2SLS in the G2SLS procedure for period 2000-2010 
    Coefficient t-stat. 
Panel A: ( )I W−  multiply 
Property tax 1997        0.49*** 3.47 
Highway expenditure 1997 -0.23 -0.83 
Safety expenditure 1997     -2.00** -2.53 
Education expenditure 1997       -0.51*** -3.09 
Sale tax 1997 -0.68 -0.76 
Log Emp. Density 2000        0.02*** 5.28 
High-tech emp. Share 2000  0.06 1.30 
Panel B: ( )I W W− multiply 
Property tax 1997     1.92* 1.66 
Highway expenditure 1997   0.69 0.51 
Safety expenditure 1997 -4.07 -1.00 
Education expenditure 1997   0.36 0.51 
Sale tax 1997 -0.84 -0.20 
Log Emp. Density 2000    0.02* 1.82 
High-tech emp. Share 2000  0.26 1.58 
Panel C: 2( )I W W−  multiply 
Property tax 1997  0.88 0.79 
Highway expenditure 1997  0.88 0.68 
Safety expenditure 1997  5.87 1.16 
Education expenditure 1997  1.00 1.16 
Sale tax 1997  2.76 0.39 
Log Emp. Density 2000      0.03** 2.37 
High-tech emp. Share 2000    0.35* 1.85 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. T-stat. based on 
residuals cluster over commuting zone. 
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Table 3.10: First-stage results for 2nd  round 2SLS in the G2SLS procedure for period 2000-2010 
            Coefficient t-stat. 
Panel A: ( )I W−  multiply 
Property tax 1997   0.2** 2.30 
Highway expenditure 1997                       -0.27 -1.39 
Safety expenditure 1997    -1.32** -2.24 
Education expenditure 1997 -0.04 -0.34 
Sale tax 1997 -0.39 -0.51 
Log Emp. Density 2000        0.01*** 2.74 
High-tech emp. Share 2000  0.01 0.40 
Panel B: ( )I W W− multiply 
Property tax 1997 0.32 1.47 
Highway expenditure 1997 -0.21 -0.70 
Safety expenditure 1997       -5.87*** -2.95 
Education expenditure 1997 -0.49 -1.19 
Sale tax 1997 -3.34 -1.20 
Log Emp. Density 2000 -0.01 -1.22 
High-tech emp. Share 2000  0.04 0.46 
ˆ[( ) ( ) | , ]E I W Wy x Wθ−         0.73*** 7.14 
Note: *, **, and *** denotes significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. T-stat. based on 
residuals cluster over commuting zone. 
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